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INTRODUCTION

Twenty-five years ago, the Supreme Court approved
capital punishment schemes that contain mechanisms to guide
the sentencer in making a rational choice between life and
death. Specifically, the Court stressed the importance of a
separate proceeding to focus solely on the matter of the
appropriate sentence, once a defendant is found guilty of a
capital crime;1 it struck down laws that called for an automatic
death sentence for even very narrow categories of murder;2 and
it has insisted that the capital sentencer consider, as a
mitigating circumstance, any factor relating to the defendant's
background, character, or circumstances of the offense that
might call for a lesser penalty.3 The Court has assumed that
these schemes and mechanisms succeed in guiding jurors'
discretion-indeed, it is on that assumption that death
sentences continue to be imposed and affirmed.
Yet interviews with jurors who participated in
deliberations that resulted in a sentence of death reveal a
pattern of capital decision making that appears to violate the
constitutional principles established for this most momentous
of decisions. Jurors who actually made the decision that a
defendant should die report a decision-making process that
departs from the legally prescribed standard in three respects:
(1) the evidence concerning the defendant's guilt spills over
into and dominates the sentencing deliberations; (2) jurors
erroneously assume that aggravating factors require a death
sentence to be imposed; and (3) jurors fail to understand,
consider, and give effect to mitigating factors.

1 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 191-92 (1976).
2 See Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 78 (1987); Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280, 301 (1976).
3 See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114-15 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio,
438
U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
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THE LEGAL BACKGROUND

Every jurisdiction that authorizes capital punishment
requires the penalty to be assessed at a separate phase of the
trial following a conviction of a capital crime. This bifurcated
procedure assumes that jurors can and do make independent
decisions, first, about guilt, and then about punishment. The
guilt phase decision involves assessing whether the prosecution
has proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, facts that establish
every legal element of the crime charged. A jury arriving at the
decision that a defendant is in fact guilty of a crime that
carries a possible death sentence has taken one important, and
necessary, step towards imposing that penalty.
The second step, which occurs at the penalty phase of
a capital trial, is not constrained by anything similar to the
structure that exists in defining criminal offenses and
establishing guilt. In fact, the United States Supreme Court
has essentially abandoned its insistence that sentencing
discretion be guided in a particular way, having approved a
variety of different capital punishment schemes falling into
three distinct categories. In some states, juries are instructed
that they may impose death once they find an aggravating
factor and after they consider evidence in mitigation (threshold
statutes);5 in others, they are told to weigh aggravating against
mitigating circumstances (weighing statutes);6 in yet others,
jurors are focused on specific factors such as the defendant's
future dangerousness and the deliberateness or heinousness of
the crime in making their penalty decision (directed statutes).
Accordingly, the Constitution does not dictate a particular
model for determining whether death is the appropriate
punishment.8 Yet the notion that the decision about penalty is
4 See William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury Project: Rationale, Design, &
Preview of Early Findings,70 IND. L.J. 1043, 1079 (1995).
See, e.g., the statutes of Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025 (Michie
1998), and South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (1998).
See, e.g., the statutes of California, CAL. PEN. CODE §190.3 (1999),
Missouri, Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.030 (1999), and North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. §
15A-2000(b) (1999).
7 See, e.g., the statute of Texas, TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(b)
(Vernon 1973).
8 See Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 979-80 (1994); Zant v. Stephens,
462 U.S. 862, 875 (1983).
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a separate one, one that entails a "reasoned moral response,"9
is inherent in modern capital sentencing.
In addition to the universal adoption of a bifurcated
procedure for capital cases, the Supreme Court has required
that to be subject to capital punishment a defendant must have
committed an "aggravated" killing-a state may not make
every killer eligible for the death penalty.10 At the same time,
the Court has also insisted that such aggravated killings may
not automatically result in a death sentence. 1 In keeping with
this constitutional principle, jurors who are convinced that
murder under particular aggravating circumstances should
always call for the ultimate penalty are subject to challenge for
cause. 2 To comply with the Constitution, jurors must at least
consider any evidence in mitigation that might call for a
sentence less than death." What it means to consider evidence
in mitigation is by no means clear, but at the very least jurors
must be willing to listen to such evidence, and while the weight
to be given to any mitigating factor is up to the sentencer, it is
not permissible to give mitigating evidence no weight."
These principles of capital punishment jurisprudence
have the following implications: First, jurors must approach
the task of sentencing someone to death with a different frame
of mind from that which resulted in the guilty verdict. The fact
that the defendant is guilty of capital murder should not, in
and of itself, be a reason that he or she must be executed.
Moreover, even the presence of aggravating factors does not
mandate the death penalty in any given case. 5 Therefore, a
9 California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
'0 See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189.
21 See Sumner, 483 U.S. at 78; Woodson, 428 U.S. at 301.
12 Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992).
13 Lockett, 438 U.S.
at 604.
Morgan, 504 U.S. at 738; Eddings, 455 U.S. at 114-15.
1 On its face, the Texas statute, TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071,
before its amendment in 1991, seemed to call for automatic imposition of the death
penalty if the two, or sometimes three, questions regarding matters in aggravation
were answered in the affirmative. The Supreme Court approved this scheme on the
assurance that, despite its facial narrowness, the second special issue regarding
whether the defendant posed a future danger would permit the sentencer to consider
any mitigating circumstances the defendant might offer. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262,
272-73 (1976). When faced with a mentally retarded defendant, however, the Court
had to acknowledge that the statute failed to provide a mechanism by which jurors
could give effect to a belief that, despite the possibility of future acts of violence, a man
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second requirement is that jurors be open to imposing a life
sentence despite a finding of aggravating circumstances. And
third, because it is "far more important"16 to treat the
defendant in a capital case, as compared to the non-capital
defendant, as a unique individual, the sentencer must consider
any circumstance that might call for a sentence less than
death. Individualized assessment of personal culpability based
and
character
is
on
the
defendant's
background
constitutionally required because of our society's long held
belief that "defendants who commit criminal acts that are
attributable to a disadvantaged background, or to emotional
and mental problems, may be less culpable than defendants
who have no such excuse."17 Accordingly, jurors are required to
consider mitigating evidence even if it does not "relate
specifically to the [defendant's] culpability for the crime he
committed;"18 they may not dismiss out of hand mitigating
factors on the basis that they do not "excuse" the crime. 9 The
concept of mitigation in capital sentencing is thus far broader
than the notion of reduced responsibility in criminal law
generally. Capital jurors may assess the appropriate weight
with the mental capabilities of a six year old should not be executed. Penry v. Lynaugh,
492 U.S. 302, 320 (1989) [hereinafter Penry 1. Accordingly, Penry's death sentence was
found to have been imposed without the consideration of mitigating circumstances
required by the Eighth Amendment. During a new penalty phase conducted upon
remand, the jury was told to give effect to mitigating circumstances in assessing the
defendants personal culpability when answering the special issues. If it found a life
sentence to be appropriate, it should simply answer one of the special issues in the
negative. See Penry v. Johnson, 215 F.3d 504, 509 (5th Cir. 2000). This instruction,
essentially telling the jurors to say "no" even if the honest answer might be "yes," was
recently also found to violate the requirement of the Eighth Amendment. Penry v.
Johnson, 121 S. Ct. 1910, 1921 (2001) [hereinafter Penry 11]. In the face of the Supreme
Court's first Penry decision and other challenges on similar grounds, the Texas
legislature added a separate question requiring the jury to consider mitigating
circumstances in its penalty determination. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
37.071(e). (This provision did not take effect until after Penry's second penalty trial.)
Some states, such as Pennsylvania, mandate death upon a finding of aggravating
factors, but only if the sentencer concludes that no mitigating factors are present. See
Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 306-07 (1990).
IG Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605.
Penry I, 492 U.S. at 319 (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545
(1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
'8 Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 (1986).
" Eddings, 455 U.S. at 113.
20 See, e.g., GEORGE FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF LEGAL THOUGHT
104
(1996) (acknowledging lack of full responsibility and excuse as diminishing
punishment, without any reference to mitigation).
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to be given to particular evidence offered in mitigation, but
under the Eighth Amendment "they may not give it no weight
by excluding such evidence from their consideration."21

II.

THE METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY

To understand how jurors in fact make the decision to
sentence a defendant to death, we examined transcripts of
interviews with jurors who have made that decision. These
interviews were conducted as part of the Capital Jury Project
("CJP"), a national study of the decision making of capital
jurors.22 The CJP has conducted interviews with some 1,155
capital jurors from 340 trials in 14 states. The interviews are
designed to chronicle jurors' experiences and decision making
over the course of the trial, to identify points at which various
influences may come into play, and to reveal the ways in which
jurors reach their final sentencing decisions. Jurors were asked
both structured questions with designated response options
and open-ended questions seeking detailed narrative accounts
of their experiences as capital jurors.
This study examines the interview responses of jurors
who imposed death sentences in six states (California,
Kentucky, Missouri, North Carolina, South Carolina, and
Texas). These states were chosen on the basis of three
considerations: (1) to represent the three principal forms of
capital statutes: threshold (KY, SC), balancing (CA, MO, NC),
and directed statutes (TX); (2) to take advantage of the
extensive open-ended interview responses which were available
from the jurors in these six states; and (3) to ensure regional
diversity. Within these states, cases were selected for analysis
if: (1) interviews were conducted with at least three jurors, and
(2) the juror responses were sufficiently lengthy and detailed to
permit thorough examination.' In all but a few of the cases,
the analysis has also been informed by review of the opinion on
21

Eddings,455 U.S. at 115.

For a more detailed description of the Capital Jury Project, see Bowers,
supra note 4.
2 The transcribed interview responses of all (three or more) jurors had to
exceed 100 kilobites for the case to be included in this analysis. In the six states
selected for the analysis, 58 death cases met this criteria and 36 death cases did not.
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direct appeal,'
which sometimes provided information
independent of the interviews on aggravating and mitigating
circumstances that had been presented to the jury. With these
sampling restrictions, the study examined the transcripts of
240 juror interviews in a total of 58 cases,25 distributed among
the six states as follows: California 68 jurors (15 cases);
Kentucky 37 (10); Missouri 23 (6); North Carolina 27 (7); South
Carolina 49 (12); and Texas 36 (8).26
This examination of the decision to sentence a
defendant to death draws foremost upon jurors' responses to
the following open-ended question that asks about how the jury
made its sentencing decision:
In your own words, can you tell me what the jury did to reach its
decision about [the defendant's name] punishment? How did the jury
get started; what topics did it discuss, in what order; what were the

major disagreements and how were they resolved?

The full transcripts of juror interviews were consulted to clarify
and augment responses to this question and to learn what
jurors recalled about the judge's instructions at the penalty
phase of the trial. For further perspective on jurors' responses
to this open-ended question, the study examined their answers
to selected questions with structured or restricted response
options used in the instrument. Jurors' responses to these
structured questions appear in Tables 1-4 of the Addendum to
this Article.

24

Given the timing of the interviews, the first appellate review process was

completed in almost all cases by the time the study commenced. The extensive delay in
processing capital appeals in California, however, meant that in a few cases from that
state no published opinions were available.
The 240 transcribed interviews represent 96% of all 250 interviews
conducted with jurors in these 58 cases. No transcription was available for interviews
with ten jurors either because jurors were not willing to have the interview taperecorded or because the tape recorder malfunctioned.
2GThe transcripts of juror interviews are on file with the authors. Excerpts
are identified by state abbreviation and juror identification number. Quotations
preceded by "J"refer to juror responses; those preceded by "Q" refer to questions from
the instrument; those preceded by "I" refer to follow-up inquiries by the interviewer. To
preserve the confidentiality of these interviews, jurors are not identified by name and
cases are identified only where reference is also made to the appellate court opinion.
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THE FINDINGS

Analysis of these interviews shows significant
deviation from the fundamental constitutional principles
governing the decision about whether a defendant should live
or die. The first section below describes how, for many jurors,
the decision about guilt appears to be so overwhelming that it
prevents truly separate decision making about punishment.
The second section focuses on the degree to which jurors feel
constrained by what they view as a requirement to impose
death if certain aggravating factors are present in the case.
And finally, the third section explores the way in which
mitigating evidence, even when it appears to have been
extensive and credible, is ignored, devalued, or discredited.
Preoccupationwith Evidence of the Defendant's Guilt
When Deciding Sentence

A.

Modern American constitutional theory posits two
separate and independent decisions in cases in which death is
a possible penalty." According to this framework, the decision
about the appropriate sentence is not supposed to enter into
the determination of the defendant's guilt; and likewise, the
decision that the defendant is in fact guilty should not, in and
of itself, dictate the proper punishment. It has already been
convincingly demonstrated that significant numbers of jurors
do not wait for the sentencing phase to consider the
appropriateness of the death penalty; they report thinking and
talking about what the sentence should be during deliberations
on guilt. Moreover, many are firmly convinced of their decision
about punishment, particularly that the sentence should be
death, before the penalty phase of the trial has even begun.28
Looking now at the penalty phase deliberations, the same
inability, or unwillingness, to keep the decisions separate
appears to allow jurors to justify a death sentence simply by
pointing to the evidence of the defendant's guilt.
See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 191-92.
See William J. Bowers et al., ForeclosedImpartialityin CapitalSentencing:
Jurors' Predispositions, Guilt-trial Experience, and Premature Decision Making, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 1476, 1486-89 (1998).
27
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The instrument used for the interviews with jurors
progresses from questions concerning the case, including the
crime, the defendant, and the victim, through questions
regarding the guilt phase of the trial to questions about the
penalty phase, with clear demarcations indicating when the
discussion is moving to the next stage.29 Nonetheless, when the
questions ask about the penalty phase of the trial, jurors
overwhelmingly continue to dwell on how convincing they
found the evidence of the defendant's guilt of the crime. Often
jurors mentioned in their interviews that the physical evidence
introduced at trial was on the table during their deliberations,
and that they went over that evidence in detail as part of their
discussion of the penalty. Indeed, at times, looking at the
physical evidence was what persuaded a juror who had been
holding out for a life sentence to go along with a decision for
death.
For some jurors, this emphasis is simply the result of
the fact that they had become "absolutely convinced" during
the guilt phase that death was the proper sentence-nothing
presented at the penalty phase could possibly change their
minds. In other instances, however, even jurors who were
undecided after the guilt phase, or actually favored a life
sentence at that point, are persuaded to impose death because
the defendant was, after all, guilty of murder. These jurors
focus on the facts of the crime, and conclude that because the
defendant intentionally took another person's life, he also
should die.
The strong emphasis on the defendant's guilt during
sentencing deliberations is quite evident in the two threshold
states, Kentucky and South Carolina. In these states, jurors
are told that they must find at least one aggravating factor in
order to impose death, and that they must consider
aggravating and mitigating circumstances in making their
sentencing decision.3 Despite such instructions, many jurors in
these states fell back on the persuasive evidence of the
defendant's guilt in describing how they had arrived at their
penalty decision. While at times they refer to aggravating and
2, Copies of the instrument used for the Capital Jury Project study are on file
with the authors.
30 See KY. REV. STAT. § 532.025 (1998); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (1998).
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mitigating factors, their conclusion about punishment seems to
result not from an analysis of these factors but from the finding
of guilt itself.
Of the three balancing states in the study (CA, MO,
NC), the statutes in Missouri3 1 and North Carolina 2 contain
lists of aggravating and mitigating factors that jurors are
instructed to weigh against each other. In California, jurors are
also told to balance aggravating and mitigating factors, but the
special circumstances in the statute are not identified as either
aggravating or mitigating." Even in these states, rather than
focusing on factors relevant to punishment, many jurors
continue to dwell on guilt. The original Texas statute
specifically directed jurors to answer two (sometimes three)
questions; if the answers were "yes," the defendant would be
sentenced to death.34 Given the special issues in the Texas
statute asking whether the killing was deliberate and whether
the defendant presents a future danger to society, jurors'
responses understandably focus on these aspects of the case.
The influence of facts showing the defendant's guilt in
making the sentencing decision is prominent in interviews
with jurors in the threshold state of South Carolina.
Responding to the question that asks how jurors deliberated
about what the penalty should be, one juror reported that they:
J:

looked over all the evidence: pictures, etc. A lot of evidence
linking [the defendant] to crime. Punishment should fit the
crime.35

A juror from another South Carolina case described the
sentencing deliberation process as follows:
J:

We reviewed the evidence. Everybody looked at the evidence
on the table. You know, we all took a vote.3'

Another juror from the same case emphasized that the
defendant had:
§ 565.030 (1999).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(b) (1999).
CAL PEN.CODE § 190.3 (1999).

3' Mo.REV. STAT.

TEYXCODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.

3-SC-1201.
36 SC-1254.

art. 37.071(b)

(1973).
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told how he really done it himself you know. When he
admitted to it. 37

Similarly, in a third case, two jurors reported on what
happened during sentencing deliberations:
J:

[Tihey brought in the evidence, like the gun and different
things that had been presented .... ."

J:

We sat around a table, kind of looking at each other and
looking at the evidence, exhibits that were entered into
evidence, on the table ....

Three jurors from another South Carolina case all began their
description of the penalty phase deliberations with references
to evidence of the defendant's guilt:
J:

We passed around the confessions."

J:

We looked over all the statements that he had written.41

J:

Basically we went back through most of the testimony.
Everything that was in the evidence. We looked at the weapon
....
We discussed the firing of the weapon, how it had to be
held in order to be fired. There was no way to accidently
discharge the weapon .... "

Other South Carolina cases show that jurors, at a time
when their task was to determine the appropriate sentence,
focused to a great extent on the persuasive evidence that the
defendant had in fact committed the murder. One juror
recalled:
J:

[Wie discussed the gun belonging to him, and his clothes,
everything was there on the table in front of us as a reminder
too, his overalls, his gun, his holster, the bullet shells,
everything ....
37
38
39
40
41
42

SC-1257.
SC-1258.
SC-1259.

SC-1286.

SC-1287.
SC-1288.

43 SC-1214.
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Another juror in the same case began his description of their
penalty phase deliberations as follows:
J:

Let's see, we had the evidence before us on the table, and we
passed around the evidence and looked at it. We looked at the
gun, we looked at the jeans and the blood stains. We talked
about these items, and how they related to the incident."

In another case, the juror reported the same procedure:
J:

Ok, I guess we got started first again by getting all of the
evidence that had been presented to us. The gun, some
clothing, the trooper's book, the ticket book you know .... "

This juror then described why the jury thought the defendant
had committed a deliberate killing rather than just panicking,
again demonstrating their emphasis on the defendant's guilt of
a capital crime.
Jurors in two additional South Carolina cases also
reported discussions at the penalty phase that stressed the
guilt of the defendants. All four jurors interviewed in one case
mentioned that the jurors reviewed the evidence at this stage:
J:

First we went back there and we just sat there for about five
minutes, we sat, we really didn't want to get started, we didn't
really, we just sat and looked at each other and the foreman
said we've got to get this done, and so we talked about, and
someone said, well, all of the evidence pointed to him being
guilty and the only thing I can say is, you know, if he's guilty
he should get the death sentence."

Other jurors in the same case also stressed the strength of the
evidence against the defendant:
J:

Well, the first thing we did, is we decided to take a poll to
write down where we thought we should be at. I think it was
ten to two for death. The judge had the evidence brought in.
We went through it. We talked about the number of gunshots
and the male being shot twice, we talked a lot about him. He
stole their goods and changed license plates. One pregnant
44 SC-1216.
45 SC-1217.
46

SC-1234.
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lady talked about her child growing up where people like [the
defendant] were alive, but she changed her verdict. She said
she had no doubt in her mind that he killed those people. We
took another poll after an hour and voted for death."
J:

We went over evidence, the photographs and the pistol and so

forth

.... 48

Finally, a juror in another South Carolina case gave
the following description of their sentencing deliberations:
J:

In the penalty phase the first thing we ended up doing was
confirming the fact that there were the aggravating
circumstances, we went through all the, we asked for all of the
evidence to be brought back into the room which they were
planning to do anyway. We got the Styrofoam mold, the view
where the bullet went, that the aggravating circumstances
were there, I think everybody knew deep down that we were
going to find him guilty and give him the death penalty at that
point in time.49

Jurors in Kentucky reveal much the same pattern.
One juror responded to the question about how the jury arrived
at their death sentence by saying:
J:

We thought with all the evidence presented there was no
doubt that he did it ....
The evidence was convincing. The
neighbor's boy (about 10 or 11 years old) identified him and
even pointed him out in court.9'

Similarly, asked about their sentencing deliberations, another
Kentucky juror simply said:
J:

Discussed he was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."'

A juror in another Kentucky case reported:

47 SC-1235.
48

SC-1237.

49 SC-1241.

0 KY-607.
91

KY-748.
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[W]e went through a process, we had to review the whole, the
forensic evidence again. Really to help these people [two
holdouts] I guess to remove any doubt from their mind that
the whole crime was intentional. 2

A similar concern about whether the defendant had committed
a deliberate killing was reported in another case, with the
same result:
J:

Well they couldn't decide whether to believe him when they
said it was self defense ... but then it kept coming back to the
fact that he had taken a gun with him and there was no
reason ... to have a gun if he didn't intend to use it except
maybe to threaten him...3

Uncharacteristically, in one Kentucky case, a juror
objected to the tenor of part of the discussion at the penalty

phase:
J:

We went over the physical evidence, which seemed like a
waste of time to me, because we all knew the physical evidence
and we all knew that he was guilty and how bad it was and all
that stuff. I think what I was looking for was just a discussion,
but in my mind, everybody else had come back into the jury
room wvith their mind made up. They had made their mind up
out in the jury box, and there was not much discussion.A

The other jurors in that case, consistent with the other findings
reported here, seemed comfortable with having made their
sentencing decision by relying on the evidence showing that
the defendant was, in fact, guilty of the murder.
J:

We looked at some of the evidence, looked at the guns. We
talked about it some more and discussed it.5 5

Asked how the holdouts were persuaded to go along with the
majority to vote for death, this same juror responded:

52

KY-694.

KY-699.
"' KY-727.
KY-724.
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More or less just us discussing it, explaining, talking about the
evidence and what happened.'

J:

One might anticipate that jurors who were specifically
instructed to examine aggravating and mitigating factors, and
to weigh them against each other, would be more likely to
concentrate at the penalty phase on circumstances beyond the
defendant's guilt of the crime. Yet the focus on guilt during
punishment deliberations is present here too. For example, one
juror in a California case reported:
It was obvious that he's guilty . . . see, in this instance, to
begin with, the kid is already guilty: We got bullets, you know
. . . we get the kid went with intent, it was his gun; he used the
same gun.-

J:

Similarly, in another California case, a juror answered the
question about penalty deliberations as follows:
J:

And we all did the same things, went over the exhibits and
that type of thing and of course we wanted to kind of, pretty
much ... prosecution's case was the evidence, we wanted to go

over that, it was dnd of ad hoc, everyone kind of reviewed the
evidence...."'

Jurors in Missouri cases also reported that review of
the evidence at the guilt phase played a major role in coming to
a decision about sentencing. In one case, two jurors described
how reviewing the evidence, particularly the taped confession,
persuaded one juror who had voted for life to agree to the death
sentence.5 9
11 went for the death penalty-and one person wanted to try
to hear some evidence-they wanted to hear the tape or watch
the video again . . . there was some kind of going back and

J:

forth . . . the second vote everyone was for the death

penalty ....

67
68
69

KY-724.
CA-19.
CA-27.
MO-3029; 3031.

60 MO-3029.
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In another case, in response to the question about penalty
deliberations, a Missouri juror said:
J:

Urn, I think we all had a real strong sense that he was guilty
and it was a heinous act. 61

A juror in a North Carolina case also focused on the
strength of the evidence regarding the defendant's guilt. In
response to the question about how the jury reached its penalty
decision, this juror said:
J:

Actual crime scene-how it was carried out, the
circumstances-the choice the defendant had between hitting
once, and running away but instead beat him severely. Point
where the defendant had a choice-showed no compassion,
didn't help him-intent on burning the safe. Tape recording
backed up the crime scene evidence.
Articles placed at crime scene matched what he said
on tape. (Defendant's shoe prints matched the one at the crime
scene and followed the pattern described on the tape.) Went
over evidence-to see what options were availabledetermined that it fit the guidelines for death. 2

The Texas statute invites, indeed requires, jurors to
make a guilt related determination in arriving at their
sentencing decision. Jurors, before amendment of the statute
in 1991, were required to concentrate exclusively on answering
the following questions:
Q:

(1) Whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the
death of the deceased was committed deliberately and with the
reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased or
another would result.
(2) Whether there is a probability that the defendant
would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a
continuing threat to society.6

61 MO-3026.
C2 NC-1081.

TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 37.071(b) (1973), amended by TEX. CRIM.
PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.071(2) (1991). In some cases, the court might submit a third
question asking whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the victim was an
unreasonable response to the victim's provocation. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
37.071(b)(3) (1973), amended by TEX.CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.071(2) (1991).
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The first question has been the subject of numerous
challenges on appeal because, on its face, it appears to convert
into an aggravating factor what, in virtually all intentional
killings, is necessarily also true. Many, indeed most, jurors
who are asked on voir dire whether they understand the
difference between "intentional" and "deliberate" at first
respond that these terms are equivalent." Only when it is
explained that under the Texas statute they will not be
permitted to serve as a capital juror unless they understand
that there is in fact a difference, do they agree that there is a
distinction.6 5 In some cases, jurors reported that their
See, e.g., Mooney v. State, 817 S.W.2d 693, 701 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)
(providing example of juror who initially expresses opinion that intentional and
deliberate are the same).
65In one case, the defense had attempted to challenge three jurors for cause
based on their failure to understand the difference between intentional and deliberate
conduct. The colloquies, as reported by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, illustrate
the difficulties:
When venireperson Zimmerman was originally asked by the prosecutor
whether he saw a distinction between the two terms, he stated that he
did, although admittedly, it was only a small one. However, he also
stated that the comments being made during voir dire had shown him
other possibilities. During questioning by the prosecutor, Zimmerman
testified as follows:

"Q.

Can you tell us and, more importantly, tell the Judge that you
recognize the distinction between the word intentional and
deliberate, and you will make the word deliberate mean
something more than the word intentional?

A.

Yes, I can say that.

A.

Yeah. I'm not sure I can say that there's a vast difference
between intentional and deliberate right now. I'm not saying
that at all. I'm saying that I recognize there's some difference.
How much, I don't know right now.

Q.

It would depend upon the facts of the case?

A.

I would say so.

Q.

So I guess the bottom line is this: Let me just ask you again.
Can you see that just because you found someone guilty of the
intentional killing of someone, it does not necessarily mean that
he did it deliberately, too? May have?
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discussions did focus on this first special issue, although the
intentional/deliberate distinction is far from clear. For
example, one juror noted:
J:

Well the way I recall the question, is I'm not sure of the exact
wording but basically we had to answer to whether we felt he
did what he did on purpose. And I took that to mean not did he
deliberate what he did but more along the lines of when he
took the action he took did he take it with the intent to have
the outcome it had and I think that we discussed that a little
bit about whether he knew when he started hitting her with
that belt that he wanted to kill her and everybody said yeah

Regardless of these fine distinctions, given that
intentional killings typically are also deliberate, in Texas the
penalty discussions most often come down to the issue of the
defendant's future dangerousness. As discussed in the next
section, the statutory scheme in Texas has produced the most
skewed results in sentencing, with the highest percentage of
capital convictions resulting in death.'
The unmistakable message that comes through these
descriptions of penalty phase deliberations is the prominent
role of the defendant's guilt of the crime. The interviews reveal
A.

Yeah. I can see that. Yes. Yes."

When Zimmerman was questioned by appellant, he appeared to be
confused by counsel's questions:

"Q. My question is: Do you as an individual feel that there's a
difference between intentionally and deliberately, or do you
think it's a meaningless distinction?
A.

In my mind, it's-they're one and the same in my usage."

Ultimately, when asked by the trial court whether he could make a distinction between
the two, Zimmerman responded affirmatively. State v. Garcia, 887 S.W.2d 846, 853
(Tex. Crim. App. 1994). Based on two other colloquies like this one, the appellate court
held that the trial court's denial of three challenges for cause did not amount to an
abuse of discretion. See id. at 853-56.
66 TX-1581.
In Texas, four out of five capital convictions end in death sentences. This is
reported for periods before and after the Texas statute was changed to include the
mitigating question. See Deon Brock et al., Tinkering with the Machinery of Death: An
Analysis of the Impact of Legislative Reform on the Sentencing of Capital Murders in
Texas, 28 J. OF CRIM. JUSTICE 343, 343-49 (2000).
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that, for many jurors, the decision about guilt is so
overwhelming that it precludes a separate decision about what
the proper sentence might be. In response to questions about
the jury's deliberations at the penalty phase of the trial, jurors
often stressed the evidence that showed the defendant had in
fact committed the murder.
The impression gained from reading jurors' narrative
descriptions of how they arrived at their penalty decision is
confirmed by their responses to structured interview questions.
When asked about some thirty-seven topics that might have
been discussed during the jury's punishment deliberations,
jurors identified guilt-related topics as those most likely to be
discussed." Of the five topics discussed most when considering
punishment, four concern the nature of the killing: the way the
victim was killed, the defendant's role or responsibility, his
planning or premeditation, his motive for the crime-matters
that typically arise in making the guilt decision. The third
most discussed topic makes guilt explicit: "how weak or strong
the evidence of guilt was." The prominence of this topic, which
should really be irrelevant to the decision about what
punishment is appropriate for the crime, underscores
dramatically how the penalty deliberations focused on the fact
of the defendant's guilt.
For jurors deciding on death, both the narrative
portions of the interviews and the statistical data show that
the story of the killing is paramount. It is of course
understandable, and indeed laudable, that jurors want to make
sure that a defendant is guilty of the crime for which he might
be executed. Yet guilt of a capital crime does not, by itself, call
for the death penalty. Absent from the reported discussion, too
often, is any reference to the defendant's life prior to the
killing, or even any explanation of why the defendant, because
he is guilty of this crime, deserves to be executed.
This obsessive focus on the defendant's guilt of the
crime might stem from the defense's failure to present the jury
with any relevant information regarding possible mitigation."
The pervasiveness of the phenomenon throughout the sample
of cases suggests, however, that it is unlikely that no
"See infra Tbl. I in the Addendum.
See infra Section III.C (discussing mitigating evidence).
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mitigation evidence was introduced in any of these cases.
Moreover, in some cases, the court's opinion on appeal
describes such evidence. For example, in a Kentucky case
described more fully in Section III.C below, two dissenting
judges described the evidence demonstrating that the
defendant suffered from mental illness exacerbated by drug
and alcohol abuse, had exhibited bizarre behavior, and had
been suicidal and depressed." Yet jurors failed in their penalty
phase discussion to address these extensive mitigating factors.
Jurors are, to be sure, free to assess the credibility of
this evidence, and it is possible that jurors refused to consider
mitigation because they simply did not believe that the
defendant's background or character was as described by the
defense witnesses. Yet the juror interviews do not reflect this
kind of a reaction. The jurors do not appear to have grappled
with the notion that, despite the defendant's clear guilt of an
aggravated murder, they could decide that he deserved a
sentence other than death. What is missing from these
interviews is any real recognition of a separate choice, an
independent decision about whether this defendant should
suffer the ultimate penalty of death.
Perception that Death is Required

B.

Just as a finding of guilt does not, alone, justify a
death sentence, so a finding of aggravation does not compel a
decision that the sentence must be death. Yet the presence of
an aggravating factor, which should merely be a condition for
making a defendant eligible for a possible death sentence,
appears to operate for many jurors as a mandate requiring that
the death penalty be imposed. With the possible exception of
Texas before 1991,71 none of the statutes involved in this study
required death to be imposed as the penalty, no matter what
evidence has been presented in aggravation. Yet in their
response to questions about how the jury arrived at its decision
to sentence the defendant to death, jurors often asserted that

70
71

Bowling v. Commonwealth, 873 S.W.2d 175, 180 (Ky. 1993).
See sources cited, supra note 15.
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the law, or the judge's instructions, made clear that if an
aggravating factor was present, the proper sentence would be
death.
In their interviews, some jurors explicitly stated that
it was their belief that aggravation required death; others used
language that more indirectly conveyed the same impression.
Accordingly, jurors reported that at the penalty deliberations,
they arrived at a death sentence based on the presence of one
or more aggravating factors that, to their minds, led
necessarily to that penalty. Jurors in all the states in the study
described this determinative role of aggravating factors. Even
in California, where jurors are instructed to consider
sentencing factors that are not designated as aggravating or
mitigating and then to weigh aggravating against mitigating
72
circumstances, a surprising number of jurors reported their
belief that a particular fact in aggravation required a death
sentence. Not surprisingly, in light of the structure of its
statute, the perception that death was the mandatory sentence
under certain circumstances, particularly if jurors thought the
defendant would be dangerous in the future, was most
prominent under the directed statute in Texas.
The laws of Kentucky7 3 and South Carolina permit a
death sentence to be imposed if an aggravating factor is found
to be present. Jurors are told that if they find such aggravation
to be established, they must then consider mitigating
circumstances in arriving at a decision about whether the
defendant should actually be subject to that penalty.75 Yet some
jurors conveyed the distinct impression that finding an
aggravating factor was the end of the inquiry. A Kentucky
juror who described the overriding feeling among the jurors
that the defendant should never be in a position to harm
anyone else asserted:
J:

In fact we had to according to the judge's instructions give
capital punishment ....

72 CAL. PEN. CODE § 190.3 (1999).

KY. REV. STAT.
74 S.C. CODE ANN.
75 Id.
7GKY-678.

§ 532.025 (1998).
§ 16-3-20 (1998).
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In another Kentucky case, a juror reported the judge's
instructions at the penalty phase in the following manner:
If there was no reasonable doubt he gave us our choices, there
was no choice if there was no reasonable doubt. We could find
him guilty I mean we already found him guilty.'

J:

Similarly, in South Carolina some jurors seemed to be
convinced that the law required death if certain factors were
present. For example, one juror recalled the judge's penalty
phase instructions:
Two major... robbery and murder. To South Carolina law,
that would be sufficient reason to give him the death penalty. 8

J:

Another described the instructions as follows:
If you followed it and got yes for this part and yes for this part
it just kind of
it all kind of fell in place it seemed like ....
progressed us into.., there is really not much choice, well you
always want to have a choice I guess but .... 8

J:

Explaining the process by which the jury arrived at its death
sentence, another South Carolina juror focused on the
aggravating factor of future dangerousness:
What would the defendant do if set free? Would [the
defendant] kill again? The law said the defendant must get
death because he murdered-the solicitor explained that this
was required by law.

J:

Similarly, a juror in another South Carolina case described
how the initial hesitation by a few jurors about imposing a
death sentence was overcome:
But after studying the law, what the law requires and her
danger that she would be even if she was in prison, that
another vote was taken and it was unanimous. 8'

J:

78
71

KY-708.
SC-1287.
SC-1288.
SC-1240.

81 SC-1231.
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In California, like in Kentucky and South Carolina,
the death penalty statute requires a finding of at least one
special circumstance before death would be a possible
punishment 2 If a jury finds that such a special circumstance
has been established, a penalty phase is conducted during
which each side may submit additional evidence in aggravation
or mitigation. The jury is then instructed to impose a death
sentence if it concludes that the aggravating circumstances
outweighed the mitigating circumstances; if it finds that
mitigating circumstances outweighed aggravating, it is told to
impose a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility
of parole.83 Yet one California juror described the judge's
instructions at the penalty phase as follows:
What I understood was as an unbiased individual I was to
weigh the evidence to find him guilty, and if I found him guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. Then I had to give him the death
sentence.-

J:

Another juror in the same case reported that it took some
convincing of a juror who wanted to impose a sentence of life
without possibility of parole:
But read instructions. If find this, then result must be by law
death sentence. The judge's instructions led the way.8

J:

In another California case, a juror described the
penalty phase decision as follows:
[F]irst thing that we did was to determine what the

J:

requirements were for capital punishment and did the
evidence substantiate for the requirements. Once we decided
that all those items had been met, there really wasn't a lot of
85
discussion.

In yet another California case, a juror recalled the judge's
instructions at the penalty phase:

82 CAL.

PEN. CODE

3id.
8

CA-9.
CA-12.
CA-16.

§

190.3 (1999).
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That it was pretty well cut and dried.... You know, in order
to get the death penalty, you got to have this to give support to
the death penalty ....

Despite the absence, in the California scheme, of any statutory
special or aggravating circumstance relating to the defendant's
future dangerousness, a juror in still another California case
described how a holdout for life was persuaded to agree with
the majority on a death sentence:
J:

Kind of what it did was allow her to vote yes without, sort of it

was the wording, it wasn't that we changed her mind, but
somehow she was able to accept the argument, I think she

finally had to admit that he would easily hurt someone else
and that our instructions said in that case we were required to
give death.'

Asked what was the most important factor in the
jury's decision to impose death, a juror in another California
case responded:
J:

The instruction, what the law specified. From what I
remember the law said if he's guilty of murder and the murder
was committed with special circumstances that the death
penalty was appropriate.89

The special circumstance that made the defendant eligible for a
death sentence was seen by this juror as virtually requiring
death. Similarly, in another California case, jurors had the
impression that if the special circumstance had been
established, the sentence should be death. In the words of one
juror:
J:

And our system has set up this way of taking care of criminals
and so if they fit in these slots that are provided for us, and
everything fits and the special circumstances are there, then
execution is justifiable.

CA-18.
CA-90.
CA-55.

' CA-37.
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In the same case, another juror responded to the question:
Among the topics you did discuss, what was the single most
important factor in the jury's decision about what defendant's
punishment should be?

Q:

with:
J:

What the law requires. And jurors agreed."

The Missouri92 and North Carolina 93 statutes require
jurors to weigh aggravating against mitigating factors, which
are identified as such in the statute, and to impose a life
sentence if the mitigating circumstances outweigh aggravation.
One Missouri juror described the whole process of decision
making as unexpectedly structured:
Well the main thing, I had never served on jury duty, until
I
this one came up. And I had no idea of the structure ....
didn't realize how structured it is. You get in there and the

J:

judge has a list ....

I thought you just went in there and

everybody talked and decided, but it's very structured. We
went right by that list. We went first step, we all decided on
the first step before we'd go to the second step. It's very
structured. It makes it... if the instructions are correct and
people follow it ... it's recipe ....

If you decide on this then it

must be this ....

At least some of the jurors in another Missouri case believed
that if the jury was unanimous in finding the aggravating
factors to have been proved, a death sentence was mandatory. 5
The jurors tried to get clarification from the judge, but were
told that no further instructions could be given beyond those
included in the original charge and the verdict sheet.
A number of jurors in North Carolina were under the
impression, despite the instructions explicitly requiring a
weighing of aggravating against mitigating circumstances, that
death was the required penalty. In one case, asked to describe
9' CA-38.
2

o0. REV. STAT.

N.C. GEN. STAT.
14 MO-3030.
's MO-3009.
13

§ 565.030

(1999).

§ 15A-2000(b) (1999).

HOW JURORS DECIDE ON DEATH

2001]

1037

the judge's instructions to the jury for deciding what the
punishment should be, a juror reported:
J:

It was clear cut the way he did it; too cut and dry. "If you say
this happened-you must say this is going to happen." 'G

In another North Carolina case, a juror similarly described a
process that seemed to lead inevitably to death:
J:

Paper with guidelines to decide what the sentence should be.
If I remember correctly there was a sheet that has a lot of
questions on it. Like was the murder committed because she
wanted to gain wealth.

I:

You mean pecuniary gains? A list of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances?

J:

Yes.

I:

So he didn't give you much more than that?

J:

No. According to the paper, after you answer all the questions,
if you answer two questions yes you have to give the death
penalty. That would automatically require the death penalty. 7

As noted in Section I.A, the Texas statute before
1991 differed considerably in its penalty phase structure from
the other schemes in our sample. Under the former Texas law,
if jurors answered the special issues in the affirmative, a death
sentence did automatically follow.98 True, to satisfy
constitutional standards the Supreme Court had held that the
special issues in theory permitted jurors to give due
consideration to any relevant mitigating circumstances, 99 yet
on its face the statute mandated a death sentence once the
aggravating factors were found to be present: there was simply
no mention of mitigation in the statute.1" Notwithstanding the
Court's interpretation, this way of framing the sentencing
decision understandably caused jurors to believe that death
NC-1065.

, NC-1078.
TEX. CODE CRIMi. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(b) (Vernon 1973).
See Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 368 (1993); Jurek, 428 U.S. at 272-73.
100 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(b) (1973).
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was the required sentence if the jurors believed that the
defendant committed a deliberate killing and that there was a
probability that he would commit future acts of violence. 1 ' One
juror in a pre-1991 Texas case described the judge's
instructions as follows:
I don't remember the specifics, but he made it very clear to us
what the law prescribed. It was like, "if.. ., then this.""2

J:

Another juror in the same case recalled:
I think I can come close to quoting what he said or at least
summarize accurately. He said that if you found him guilty in
committing a murder while in the act of a burglary, therefore,
it's a capital murder case and, as I remember, the only
question we had to answer is whether he was a threat to
society and, was it danger, was a danger to society, would
likely do this again. He'd been found sane, which is an issue
we didn't discuss. We found him guilty of murder and the
remaining question was would he do it again? 03

J:

The other result of this statutory scheme, and one
which persists even under the revised version, is that jurors
see themselves as simply answering factual questions, instead
of actually making a decision about whether the defendant
should live or die. The structure of the Texas law, thus, makes
it easy for jurors to shift responsibility for the defendant's
death from themselves to the law or to the court. Jurors in
Texas are never faced directly with the question of what the
defendant's sentence should be. Instead, they are asked to
respond to factual questions that, depending on the answer,
dictate the sentence imposed by the court. Yet Texas courts
have not been persuaded by the claim that because jurors in
Texas may not be aware of the inevitable effect of their
responses to the special issues, they mistakenly believe that
actual responsibility for the defendant's sentence lies with the
law or the judge.1"
101 See supra text
102 TX-1613.
'03

accompanying note 67.

TX-1614.

This claim was raised in Curry v. State, 910 S.W.2d 490 (Tex. Crim. App.
1995), but not decided because it had not been properly preserved. Id. at 496-97. The
most extensive discussion related to this point appears in Draughon v. State, 831
'
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In a case tried under the original Texas statute, jurors
reported convincing two jurors who voted in favor of life to go
along with the majority on the basis that they were not in fact
imposing a death sentence. One juror described the process of
convincing them to go along with the majority:
J:

We were using persuasive tactics by saying, you are not
sentencing him to death. They did that all by themselves, and
the judge is the one who will pronounce the sentence."'

This juror described the best thing about the give and take of
jury deliberation on punishment as:
J:

How everyone came together to try to explain to this one lady
that she was not sentencing this man to death."G

In another pre-1991 Texas case, several jurors
mentioned the feature of Texas law that confined their decision
making to simply answering factual questions as decisive to
their deliberations at the penalty phase. One juror recalled
that the best thing about the deliberations was:
J:

[I]t was easier-thought it would be harder than just
answering questions.107

S.W.2d 331 (Tex. Grim. App. 1992). The issues there were whether the jury should be
told of the consequence of failure to agree on special issues, and whether jurors might
be misled into thinking that they could impose a life sentence only if at least ten jurors
answered no to one of the special issues. Id. at 337. The court held that there is no
constitutional requirement that the jury be told of the consequences of a hung jury at
the penalty phase (in Texas, a hung jury results in a life sentence), because their
impression that there would be a new penalty trial would simply make them take their
task, and their wish to come to a unanimous verdict, more seriously. Id. at 337-38. It
may be noteworthy that the Louisiana Supreme Court has come to a different
conclusion, finding that the pressure to arrive at a unanimous verdict, in order to avoid
the perceived necessity of a retrial, injected an element of arbitrariness into the
decision-making process. See State v. Williams, 392 So.2d 619, 634-35 (La. 1980).
Regarding the second issue, the Texas court decided that the instructions given are not
reasonably subject to an interpretation that would violate Mills v. Maryland.
Draughon,831 S.W.2d at 338.
105 TX-1611.
..
7 TX-1611.
107 TX-1650.

1040

BROOKLYNLAWREVIEW

[Vol. 66:4

Another juror criticized the Texas law for this feature,
which he characterized as "an extreme mind game""' in which
the jury did not decide on life or death but rather just
answered questions. This juror would have preferred it if the
jury had been required to make the decision in a
straightforward way. Another juror in the same case, however,
took great comfort in the fact that the jury was simply
answering questions. This juror mentioned specifically the
instructions from the court that explained that the jury was
not in fact deciding whether to sentence the defendant to die:
J:

[The judge] said that he wanted us to understand that we
were not choosing whether somebody should get the death
penalty or not as far as being responsible if he ends up dying
as a result of getting the death penalty. That it was up to us to
answer yes or no to, I think it was three, questions. And based
on the way we answered those questions. The death penalty
would be assigned or not assigned, according to Texas law. The
defense tried to make us feel as though we would be
responsible for [the defendant] dying if we gave him the death
penalty so I think that the judge maybe took some of that
sting away.'

Even in one Texas case110 tried under the amended
statute,"' the jury interviews reveal in a dramatic way how the
jurors in favor of death were able to effectively use the
argument that the jury was simply answering questions,
rather than imposing a death sentence. According to one juror:
J:

One lady could not sentence anyone to death.

I:

How was this resolved?
108TX-1575.

...TX-1573.
110Curry v. State, 910 S.W.2d 490 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).
III The revised Texas statute adds the following question:
Whether, taking into consideration all of the evidence, including the
circumstances of the offense, the defendant's character and
background, and the personal moral culpability of the defendant, there
is a sufficient mitigating circumstance or circumstances to warrant
that a sentence of life imprisonment rather than a death sentence be
imposed?
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(e)(Supp. 1999). A negative answer to this
question, along with affirmative answers to the others, requires the court to impose a
death sentence. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(g) (Supp. 1999).
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The judge did that sentencing; the jury only had to say [the
'
defendant] was guilty of capital murder. 12

J:

The majority assured this holdout that:
she wasn't pronouncing [death] . . .we had the instructions
right in front of us. 3

J:

It was only by convincing this woman that she was not in fact
sentencing the defendant to death that the jury was able to
report a unanimous verdict on the special issues.
Consistent with jurors' narrative accounts, statistical
analysis of the Capital Jury Project data confirms that a
substantial proportion of jurors who voted for a death sentence
believed that the law required death when in fact it did not.
Close to five of ten jurors on death cases believed that they
must impose a death sentence if the evidence proved that the
crime was heinous, vile, or depraved." 4 Four of ten thought
death must follow a finding that the defendant would be
dangerous in the future.115
Jurors assigned the task of deciding whether a
defendant should live or die must not assume that the law
sanctions only the most severe penalty. Yet too many jurors
report that they arrived at a death sentence because the law
required it, or that the responsibility for the sentence in some
other way rested elsewhere.
Failureto ConsiderMitigatingCircumstances

C.

Finally, the interviews reflect a pattern in which
mitigating factors play a disturbingly minor role in jurors'
deliberations about whether a defendant should be sentenced
to death. In stark contrast to the prominence of reported
discussion of guilt and factors in aggravation, evidence that
might tend to mitigate the offense is often entirely absent from
the description of the process leading to imposition of the death
TX-1581.
. TX-1581.
114 See infra Addendum, Tbl. 2.
1"

',5
Id. For an early report of responses to these two questions among jurors
from both death and life cases see Bowers, supranote 4, at 1091, Tbl. 7.
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penalty in these cases. It is difficult to imagine that jurors are
able to make the "individualized assessment of the
appropriateness of the death penalty""6 mandated by the
Constitution without consideration of circumstances that
would mitigate against that sentence. Even when jurors do
report a discussion of mitigating factors, their understanding of
what the law defines as mitigation is extremely limited. In the
relatively rare instance when mitigating evidence is
mentioned, jurors either seem not to understand what they are
to do with such evidence or they dismiss it out of hand as no
excuse for the murder. The impression conveyed is that unless
the evidence in mitigation either proves that the killing was
not deliberate or furnishes an excuse for the killing, such as
insanity or duress-factors that would invalidate the capital
murder conviction-it does not provide adequate reason to
impose a sentence other than death.117
Of course various explanations are possible for the
lack of reported discussion of mitigating evidence during the
penalty phase deliberations, not all of which suggest problems
with the capital decision-making process. First, in some cases
no evidence of mitigation may have been presented at trial,
either because there was none available, or because counsel
simply did not seek it or present it effectively. This possibility
was taken into account by examining both the entire transcript
of the jury interviews and the appellate opinions in these cases
to discover any mitigation that was introduced. In a significant
number of cases, this process revealed that mitigating evidence
had in fact been presented, despite the absence of any reported
discussion at the penalty phase deliberations. In those cases
where no mitigation was presented, the problem rests with
defense counsel and admittedly does not pose the kind of issue
regarding jurors' devaluation of such evidence that we are
considering here.

11 Penry I,

492 U.S. at 317; see also Morgan,504 U.S. at 736.
It is important to recall here that mitigation in the death
penalty context
has a broader meaning than what might be considered to reduce culpability in
traditional criminal law theory. See supratext accompanying notes 19 & 20.
117
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Second, it is conceivable that evidence in mitigation
was introduced, but the jurors either did not find it credible'
and worthy of discussion or did in fact discuss it, but failed to
mention that discussion during their interviews. It is certainly
plausible that jurors, who had agreed to a death sentence,
would concentrate on the evidence that would justify that
sentence. Notwithstanding these possibilities, the fact that the
omission of mitigation in the interviews is so consistent
suggests that discussion of the topic was not central to the
decision making in most cases.
By far the most likely explanation, given the strong
and consistent overall pattern, is that jurors tended to focus on
the evidence in aggravation; they simply did not seriously
address any themes in mitigation that were presented by the
defense. This conclusion is supported by statistical data from
the CJP interviews documenting the misperception among
almost half the jurors that mitigating factors must be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt to be considered, and the
misperception by more than half the jurors that mitigating
factors may be considered only if all jurors agree."' This
pattern raises serious concerns that jurors arrive at death
sentences without the required consideration of mitigating
circumstances. Under cases interpreting the Eighth
Amendment, "the sentencer must be permitted to consider all
mitigating evidence. The possibility that a single juror could
block such consideration, and consequently require the jury to
impose the death penalty, is one we dare not risk."'
The interviews support the conclusion that many
jurors fail to consider evidence in mitigation or, if they do
"consider" it, they lack clear understanding of what the law
asks them to do with such evidence. There is virtually no recall
of any instructions regarding what consideration is required of
evidence in mitigation. In some cases, the jurors recognize that
evidence in mitigation has been presented, but do not know
what the law allows, or requires, them to do with such
evidence. When discussion of potentially mitigating evidence is
118 See infra, Addendum, Tbl. 3. The Supreme Court has held that such a

unanimity requirement violates the Eighth Amendment. McKoy v. North Carolina, 494
U.S. 433, 439-40 (1990); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 374-75 (1988).
"o Mills, 486 U.S. at 384.
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mentioned, a frequent response is that the evidence cannot
excuse the crime. If the defendant was an adult, and knew
right from wrong, he could not avoid responsibility for the
killing; and that responsibility, implicitly, meant paying with
his life.
The very word "mitigation" is foreign to most
jurors 1°--and indeed a number of the jurors who were
interviewed obviously did not understand the term, at times
actually confusing it with aggravation.'21 Even jurors who did
seem to understand the term often dismissed evidence that
clearly should be considered mitigating, such as childhood
abuse and mental impairment, as not "excusing" the
defendant's conduct or reducing responsibility.
Some jurors expressed confusion about the proper
function of mitigation in making a capital sentencing decision.
For example, one juror in a California case" regretted that the
jury:
J:

had no instructions or didn't ask as to what role childhood
should play. Didn't know if defendant's childhood was valid
reason. Should have asked judge if that was valid reason to
deny death.In

Yet the California Supreme Court in that case rejected the
claim that the jury should have been provided with definitions
of the terms "aggravating" and "mitigating," finding it well
12 See Craig Haney, Taking Capital JurorsSeriously, 70 IND. L.J. 1223, 1229
(1995) (reporting that less than half the study subjects could give even a partially
correct definition of mitigation); Peter Meijes Tiersma, Dictionaries and Death: Do
CapitalJurors UnderstandMitigation?, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 1, 10-22 (describing studies
and anecdotal data regarding juror confusion over mitigation).
121 See, e.g., one Missouri juror, who recalled
the judge's instructions as
follows:

J: He said that you could have a mitigating circumstance that
outweighed aggravating circumstances in which case death penalty
would be advised. If there was no mitigating then there was no death
penalty.
MO-3032.
122 At the first trial, this case ended in a hung jury on the penalty, at a second
penalty phase trial, the defendant was sentenced to death. Jury interviews were
conducted with five jurors, two of whom voted for life, from the first trial and one from
the second. Quotations are drawn exclusively from the interview transcripts of jurors
who voted for death.
123 CA-133.
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established that these terms are "commonly understood terms
that the trial court need not define for the jury."124 The

defendant had relied on the mitigating effects of his violent
upbringing.'2 His father, frequently drunk, beat the defendant
and his mother. 121 One juror described the defendant's family
as "a little crazy," and then added:
J:

The parents were kind of fairly normal, they do things... the
father ... like waking him up in the morning by shooting a
gun by his head.127

His mother was imprisoned for a federal offense when the
defendant was four years old, resulting in his being placed first
in foster homes and then sent to his father, who continued to
beat him and use guns in the house in the presence of his
children.' The defendant's father admitted that he sometimes
had locked the defendant in the house, the basement, or the
closet to prevent him from running away.129 None of this

childhood abuse, however, persuaded the jurors that the
defendant might deserve a sentence less than death.
Jurors in some of the cases also seemed to find that
the evidence offered did not adequately prove the mitigating
facts, perhaps because of common misperceptions about the
burden of proof on such evidence. In one North Carolina case,"'
for example, one of the jurors reported that while the defense
said that the defendant had been neglected and that his
mother had
taken drugs while pregnant, these facts were never
"proven." 3 ' Another juror also suggested that more could have
been done in presenting the mitigating factors when he said
that he might have changed his mind about the penalty if he
had been given more information about the defendant's
upbringing and family.'32 A third juror, who seemed rather
124 People v. Hawkins, 897 P.2d 574, 600 (Cal. 1995) (quoting People v.
Kirkpatrick, 874 P.2d 248, 265 (Cal. 1994)).
1" Id. at 582.

Id.
CA-130.
12 Hawkins, 897 P.2d at 582.
129 Id.
130North Carolina v. Lyons, 468 S.E.2d 204 (1996).
123
127

1"1
132 NC-1141.
NC-1140.
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sympathetic to the defendant, confirmed the thinness of the
defense's case. She described the defendant as:
J:

[L]ost in the system. Pitiful background. Basically a street kid.
I'm not so sure he knows right from wrong like the rest of us.
They don't go into a great detail even though they have a
psychologist.
It was a very sad situation all the way around, he was
black, raised in the ghetto, and so on."

The mitigating evidence presented in this case seems
to have consisted largely of testimony by the defendant's expert
psychologist. According to this expert, the defendant suffered
from bipolar disorder, caused by his mother's consumption of
alcohol while she was pregnant with him, and antisocial
personality disorder; he was also a substance abuser. Several
of the jurors noted, however, that the psychologist was a poor
witness who was not well prepared.
Despite their expressed reservations about the quality
of the evidence presented in mitigation, the jury in this case,
according to the appellate court opinion, did mark in its verdict
that mitigating factors were present:
The jury found one statutory mitigating circumstance, that the
offense was "committed while defendant was mentally or
emotionally disturbed," and four nonstatutory mitigating
circumstances: (1) the defendant was emotionally abused as a child,
(2) the defendant was abandoned by his mother as a child, (3) the
defendant's current psychological disorders are related to his
mother's abuse of drugs, and (4) the defendant has a long history of
alcohol and drug abuse. The jury also found the statutory catchall
mitigating circumstance.'

Given these findings, the jurors' decision that the
defendant should be sentenced to death seems to reflect their
opinion, as expressed in the interviews, that mitigating
circumstances such as abuse during childhood or mental
impairment simply do not provide an "excuse" for the killing.
Regarding his upbringing, as one female juror put it:

"

NC-1142.
Lyons, 468 S.E.2d at 215 (citations omitted).
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Most felt background was horrendous but that it did not make
up for what he did. There are people who had just as bad of
circumstances and didn't do what he did."'

Another female juror agreed:
J:

We all thought, well he was abused but you can't keep using
that as an excuse.

A male juror displayed a highly dismissive attitude towards
the mitigating evidence:
J:

They was coming up with some disorder that he had that was
brought on, that was induced by his mother's drinking during
pregnancy, and he was brought up in an abusive home ....
[The defense] tried to pawn off on defendant's family and
upbringing... bipolar disorder.'

Another juror in the same case was most emphatic in rejecting
the "abuse excuse." He reported:
J:

Everyone's got a rough childhood. Everyone's abused now ....
The defense tried to say he was abused, all that standard
nonsense .... There is so much stupid crime. It's ridiculous,

you know. We have so many liberal "do wells" those bleeding
heart liberals, this is nonsense."'

In their interviews, all four of the jurors noted some
evidence of the defendant's mental disturbance-quite aside
from testimony regarding his mental condition, he "went a
little crazy" during the trial itself.'39 At one point the defendant
threw a Rolodex at the judge, and he apparently acted up in
various other ways, some of which the jurors weren't supposed
to know about.4 One juror had learned that the defendant
tossed urine and water on the jail guards.'

...NC-1142.
...NC-1141.
137NC-1140.
138

NC-1143.

...
NC-1141.
140NC-1140.
141 NC-1140.
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Yet the jurors seemed to believe that psychological
impairment had to rise to the level of insanity to warrant a
lesser sentence. According to one juror, the mitigating
circumstances focused on:
J:

[the defendant's] background, he was abused, . . he was
neglected, a drug addict, abandoned by this mother, etc. In my
opinion he was very much a product of his environment, but
[the] psychologist who testified said he knew the difference,
right from wrong....

This juror identified as the strongest factor for death:
J:

He didn't have a mental illness. He knew right from wrong.'

Another juror echoed the same theme:
J:

He had personality disorder, he was antisocial. He wasn't
insane.'

The defendant's reaction to the jury's announcement of
its penalty decision gave some jurors pause regarding his
mental condition. What kept sticking in one juror's mind is the
defendant's laughing when the sentence was announced:
J:

When that happened hair stood up
14 on the back of my neck and
I knew the man just wasn't right. '

Another juror reported that the defendant:
J:

gave out this big laugh and said he didn't mean to do it. This
left jurors wondering if they made the right decision.46

In a Kentucky case the defense had also presented
extensive evidence of the history of mental illness in the
defendant's family as well as the defendant's own mental
condition, which deteriorated in the period leading up to the
killings. Only one of the jurors interviewed even mentioned any
142 NC-1141.

NC-1141.
NC-1140.
145 NC-1140.
'" NC-1141.
143
144
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evidence of the defendant's emotional or mental disturbance,
and these were his reactions:
J:

ITIhe feeling is that someone talked about his mental
state somewhat, but there was no evidence saying that he was
insane or anything. I think they presented some evidence or
some testimony that he might have some emotional problems
at the time, a possible sleep deprivation, but it wasn't, it just
wasn't presented well or it wasn't a good defense. It obviously
didn't work, so. The feeling is again that there was some kind
of presentation ....
I think there was some mention of that, that he'd had
some kind of a possible troubled childhood, maybe an alcoholic
father or something. I know the general feeling was they were
trying to promote sympathy toward the defendant ....
I do remember they hinted at there was some possible, a
possible bad gene line in the family somewhere, that there
was, I do remember a hint of that, but there was never any
formal presentation of it. To me, it was a poor defense
strategy. It's just a hint of it, well, lets get some real evidence
up here.14 Let's
see some disturbed family members. They didn't
7
do that.

Yet from the appellate opinions, it would seem that
the sentencing decision in this case was a result of a weighing
of the aggravating factor (multiple killing) against the
mitigating evidence. On direct appeal, the Kentucky Supreme
Court (with two justices dissenting) rejected defense claims
that the defense was not permitted to introduce mitigating
evidence and that the trial court improperly failed to charge
the jury regarding mitigation and the extreme emotional
disturbance defense.' 48 In its subsequent opinion denying post-

conviction relief, the court denied an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim that was based on defense counsel's failure to
investigate potential mitigation evidence:
In the penalty phase, counsel introduced extensive evidence
pertaining to Appellants family history of mental illness, his
childhood, his marital history, and his deteriorating mental
condition in the period leading up to the murders. Counsel presented

KY-695.
'48
Bowling, 873 S.W.2d at 180.

147
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strong evidence upon which the jury could have reduced Appellant's
sentence, had it seen fit to do so. The jury simply weighed the
evidence and chose not to reduce the sentence."'

The interviews with jurors give a very different impression,
suggesting that hardly any evidence of mitigation had been
presented at all.
The mitigating evidence presented in another
Kentucky case, which some jurors seemingly found persuasive,
similarly failed to prevent imposition of a death sentence. One
of the jurors appeared to have quite a bit of sympathy for the
defendant, describing him as:
J:

[A] sad person-never had much love.'

Yet this juror characterized the defense's mitigation evidence
as claiming that the defendant's background-his poor
upbringing-caused him to commit the crime. She immediately
added:
J:

At some point as an adult, you have to take responsibility for
your actions.'5'

She also quickly tied the evidence of abuse to the issue of
whether the defendant knew right from wrong. In her response
to the question about penalty deliberations, she repeated the
same two themes of responsibility and ability to distinguish

right from wrong:
J:

I think the biggest thing we talked about, because some said,
we, he was abused, and there were two, in fact, that just felt
like that had a big factor in the person that he was. But then
the rest of us said that there comes a time in everybody's life
when you have to take care of your own responsibilities and
you know right from wrong, and we just thought that he did."2

141 Bowling v.

Commonwealth, 981 S.W.2d 545, 550 (Ky. 1998).

KY-723. This juror's perception may have been affected by an exchange she
overheard in the restroom during the trial. Apparently, in a conversation between the
defendants mother and his sister, his mother said that she hated the defendant, to
which his sister responded that she had to act as though she loved him. Id.
11 KY-723.
152 KY-723.
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Two other jurors interviewed in the same case also seemed to
equate the evidence in mitigation regarding the defendant's
poor upbringing with the notion he did not know right from
wrong. One reported:
[T]he whole discussion here on this thing was the mitigating
circumstances as regards how he was raised. Did the person
know right from wrong. And that's what the defense was
trying to say, perhaps he didn't. I just couldn't handle that."

J:

Another juror characterized the defense as:
[W]anting to use his childhood as a defense, as far as his
upbringing. Not knowing right from wrong.'s

J:

These same patterns are evident in cases from other
states. The notion that mental impairment must rise to the
level of insanity to be considered mitigating is particularly
prevalent. As one Texas juror reported:
They tallked about some of the things he did as a boy in a
deprived environment, and you can give some leniency there,
but being an adult and doing such a heinous thing... I think
he knew right from wrong, I just don't think he cared. I guess
that's what I am trying to say. ' 5

J:

A juror in another Texas case sounded the same theme:
[Ilt was pretty weak argument that his background should
excuse him. You know that is a weak argument if you wanna
look at it in that way. It's a weak argument because you
haven't had a good childhood or you haven't had advantages
that it excuses you from killing somebody.s

J:

In a North Carolina case, jurors similarly quickly
rejected the notion that neglect or abuse in childhood should be
considered mitigating.

KY-725.
KY-726.
1 TX-1613.
1 TX-1582.
'

'u
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There were no arguments except that one time when one
woman thought that his childhood might possibly be a
mitigating circumstance and we all agreed that he was 18-he
could make his own decisions and you can't use that as a
crutch forever. You can't go around killing people and saying
"well I'm sorry." ... And they were in Baltimore for just 3
weeks when they were living out of trash cans and that's about
the worst thing that happened to him so ....

J:

In another North Carolina case, 1 8 jurors also apparently
discussed the effect of childhood upbringing in terms of
whether the defendant should still be held responsible. Jurors
never addressed the notion of reduced responsibility, however,
rather than a total lack of responsibility.
Here, as with the other findings, jurors' responses to
structured questions about what was discussed during the
penalty deliberations corroborate the information gained from
their narrative descriptions. Of the topics jurors reported
discussing the least, almost all are factors that would be
considered mitigating.'5 9 Fewer than a quarter of the jurors
said that "the defendant's background or upbringing" received
a "great deal" of discussion in determining the sentence,
despite its central importance to the individualized
examination of the defendant's character and background that
the Constitution requires in capital cases.' Of course, topics
such as drug or alcohol use, and mental ability or mental
illness are not likely to be relevant in every case, but the fact
that they are among the six least discussed of the thirty-seven
topics means that they receive relatively little attention in
most death cases. Ironically, "what moral values require," the
topic that jurors might be expected to discuss extensively if
they understood that their mission in the penalty phase of the
trial is to make a "reasoned moral choice," ranks thirty-fourth
161
among the full list of thirty-seven topics of discussion.
These interviews show that evidence in mitigation is
often ignored in the penalty deliberations. When jurors do
discuss such evidence, they simply do not take seriously the
'57
158

NC-1096.
NC-1092.

See infra Addendum, Tbl. 1, Panel B.
160Id.
,61 Id.
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idea that the tragic lives experienced by these defendants
might mitigate their culpability. Rather, the prevalent notion is
that imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment, often life
without parole, would amount to a decision "excusing" the
defendant for the crime.
IV.

WHY Do JURORS MAKE THESE DECISIONS IN THIS
WAY?

Since jurors do engage in decision making that is
contrary to what the law prescribes, two questions should be
addressed: "Why do jurors make these decisions in this way?"
and "Can anything be done to conform capital decision making
to the constitutional model?" In answer to the first question,
this Article will offer some tentative ideas, and in answer to
the second one, consider some changes in the way the penalty
trial is conducted and in the way juries are selected and
instructed that might improve the quality of capital justice.
One explanation for the overwhelming impact of the
evidence presented at the guilt phase of the trial derives from
the work of Reid Hastie and Nancy Pennington. Their research
has shown that jurors faced with even the seemingly logical,
algebraic question at issue in determining guilt resort largely
to a Story Model in arriving at a verdict.1 62 In a criminal trial,
the prosecution's story is the central story; it goes first, and it
is presented with much fanfare. If the trial were a play, it
would consume the entire first act, and set the stage for what
followed. And in a murder trial, the prosecution's story is
inevitably one of violence, violence at the hands of the
defendant.163
As we have seen, this evidence regarding the crime
looms large at the penalty phase of the trial; for example,
jurors often describe the physical presence of the weapon used,
or photographs of the victim, in the jury room during the

'G See Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, The Story Model for JurorDecisionMaking, in INSIDE THE JUROR ch.8 (Reid Hastie ed., 1993).
' See Austin Sarat, Violence, Representation, and Responsibility in Capital
Trials: The View from the Jury, 70 IND. L.J. 1103, 1124-25 (1995).
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deliberations. In the hands of the prosecutor, the story of the
killing will be linked to the conclusion that the sentence should
be death.
A South Carolina murder case, involving two
defendants who were tried separately, vividly illustrates how
the prosecutor's story dramatically calls for death as
punishment.'" The defendants, two young men in their early
twenties from lower middle class families, had robbed a movie
theater where one of them had previously been employed. In
the process they killed two teenaged workers at the theater,
shooting them both in the head. One victim was found in the
woods in a position that the prosecutor portrayed as showing
that he was on his knees, with his hands together, begging for
his life.'65 This image dominated the discussions at the penalty
phase of the trials of both defendants.
Even jurors who felt some sympathy for the
defendants and their families kept coming back to the dead boy
on his knees:
Q:

Is there anything about this case that sticks in your mind, or
that you keep thinking about?

J:

[Tihe other boy begged for his life and they shot him while he
was begging for his life.' 6

In response to three different questions about what were the
most important factors in the jury's decision about what the
defendant's punishment should be, another juror in the same
case stressed the fact that the victim was begging the
defendant not to kill him.'6 A third juror also noted that this
aspect of the case made her feel that the punishment should be
death:

.4

SC-1213 & SC-1258.

165The prosecutor in one of these cases mentioned this kneeling position of the
victim no less than five times in his closing argument. See trial transcript on file with
the authors, at pp. 1618, 1621, 1643, 1644.
6 SC-1213.

167 J:

I think when he shot the boy and him begging him not to ....
1214; see also responses to Questions IVA4A and IVA4B.

SC-
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The other young man was taken out in the country. It
appeared that he was on his knees with his hand folded in
front of him begging for, you know, he might have been saying
his last prayers.'

All four jurors interviewed in the other defendant's case also
recalled the praying or begging position of the victim in
describing the crime.169
For any hope of a life sentence, the defense must
produce a strong counter story to dislodge this kind of
imagery-a picture crying out for the ultimate punishment.
Yet the defendant's life story of mitigation has the initial
disadvantage of being the side story, hardly a competing story.
It follows rather than precedes the prosecution's story. Its
details are less dramatic and more complex than the story of
the killing. To present this story effectively is an
extraordinarily complicated and difficult task that requires the
skillful blending of lay and expert testimony.7 ° Most lawyers,
even the most competent ones, are not trained to tell such
stories; many do not understand the importance of telling the
intricate story of the defendant's background and upbringing to
help jurors make the moral choice assigned to them. 7'
Defense lawyers in the two South Carolina cases
presented mitigating evidence on behalf of their defendants
that was intended to show their reduced culpability during the
crime and to demonstrate psychological and character traits
calling for a sentence less than death. Evidence from twentyseven character witnesses attested to one defendant's strong
Christian upbringing and suggested that the robbery and
killings were aberrational-a result of excessive drinking and
'68 SC-1215.
168 SC-1258-1261.
170

In his insightful article, also relying on data from the Capital Jury Project,

Scott Sundby suggested that the trial attorney approach the presentation of this kind
of evidence in much the way a composer would approach a musical score; lay and
expert testimony need to play solo and accompanying roles harmonized so as to take
account of jury biases favoring certain types of lay witnesses and viewing some experts
suspiciously as "hired guns." Scott E. Sundby, The Jury as Critic:An Empirical Look at
How Capital Juries Perceive Expert and Lay Testimony, 83 VA. L. REV. 1109, 1115
(1997).
' See Craig Haney, Mitigation and the Study of Lives: On the Roots of Violent
Criminality and the Nature of Capital Justice, in AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT ch.13 (James R. Acker et al. eds., 1998).
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pressure from the co-defendant. On behalf of the other
defendant, evidence showed that he did not in fact kill either
victim, that he had no previous record, and that he had
suffered from depression, borderline schizoid personality, and
alcoholism since the age of thirteen. Ironically, this defendant's
abuse of alcohol and his submissive personality, argued in
mitigation by the defense, actually became aggravating factors
in the eyes of some jurors who asserted that such
characteristics would tend to make the defendant more likely
to present a future danger to society:
J:

The reason I think he would be dangerous in the future is
because of the fact that I think he was very easily influenced
by others, and because of the fact of his dependence on

alcohol.'

Neither defendant's story was told in a way that was
persuasive to the juries deciding whether these young men
should be executed. In effect, the prosecutor's story so
overwhelmed the defense story that jurors actually converted
arguments offered to show reduced culpability and diminished
responsibility into elements of the prosecution story of the
defendant's inhumanity to the victim and danger to society.
In the same way that the Story Model helps to explain
how jurors deal with the evidence of guilt by constructing their
own cognitive understanding of the crime with links to the
"appropriate" punishment, Irving Janis's "groupthink" model of
group decision making helps to account for the reluctance of
jurors to switch gears when they move from the guilt to the
penalty phase of the trial-to explain why jurors become
fixated on guilt and aggravation while paying little attention to
mitigation. Janis's theory holds that a group operating under a
norm of consensus, or unanimity, in reaching a decision will
ignore or discredit information that does not contribute to what
seems to be an emerging consensus.' 3 The group will resist
172

SC-1213.

'7

See IRVING JANIS, DECISION-MAKING ch. 8 (1977). In the context of jury

decision making, such patterns with respect to the deliberations of mock juries
operating under majority vs. unanimity decision rules are documented in the work of
Reid Hastie and Charlan Naineth. See generally STEVEN D. PENROD ET AL., INSIDE THE
JURY (1983); Charlan Nameth, InteractionsBetween Jurors as a Function of Majority
vs. Unanimity DecisionRules, 7 J. APp. SOC. PsY. 38 (1977).
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arguments or information that appear to threaten the original
understandings on which the initial consensus was forged.
In the case of a capital trial, when unanimity has been
reached on guilt, the agreed-upon issues and arguments
concerning guilt are apt to dominate subsequent thinking
about punishment. Jurors will tend to feel that the punishment
is dictated by guilt considerations, particularly the presence of
aggravating factors, and even see the discussion of mitigation
as irrelevant, if not subversive, to the group's mission. Jurors
who are not willing to impose death will be angrily challenged
as having violated their oaths as jurors.
Having the penalty phase of the trial open by
addressing the question of whether an aggravating factor is
present encourages the jury to think about the evidence in the
same way it was told to view it at the guilt phase. 74 It follows
from this continuation of guilt-phase thinking that jurors may
perceive, once they have found aggravation to have been
proved, that death is the prescribed punishment, just as jurors
are told that if they find all the elements of a crime proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, they must convict.
In addition, the way evidence of aggravation is
presented may play a role in elevating the impact of that
evidence. The prosecution is permitted, in most jurisdictions, to
introduce such additional evidence at the penalty phase,
including evidence considered so prejudicial that it is excluded
at the guilt phase (e.g., prior crimes, gruesome photographs,
victim impact). Introduction of such evidence immediately
before the jurors start their deliberations about sentencing
may give the evidence particular significance in the minds of
the jurors and set the stage for what feels to them like a
continuation of a guilt type of trial.
The instruction to capital jurors that they must
"consider" any mitigating circumstances involves a different
kind of thinking, distinct from the way jurors (and lawyers, for
that matter) are taught to evaluate facts. There is no model for
dealing with such evidence; no guidance on what it means to
174

Indeed, some statutes, such as those in Louisiana and New York, designate

aggravating factors as elements of the crime, so that the jury's task in assessing
whether the murder is in some way "aggravated" simply reaffirms a decision the jury
already made at the guilt stage of the trial. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.30 (West
1988); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 60.06, 125.27, 400.27 (McKinney 1995).
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"consider" it, what might be the appropriate weight of
particular kinds of mitigation, or how, in making a reasoned
moral choice, such evidence might properly weigh against
aggravating factors. The lack of guidance regarding how to
think about mitigation obviously compounds the problems
associated with presenting such inherently complex evidence in
an effective way. Moreover, defendants and jurors often do not
share the same norms or experiences, so that even a well-told
story does not really get heard.175 And, of course, some jurors
will refuse to listen to the defendant's story, having made up
their minds during the guilt phase that death was the proper
sentence.
In the absence of an understanding of how to take
mitigation into account in capital decision making,'7 6 jurors
naturally turn to the analogy provided by the guilt trial,
namely defenses that may serve as an excuse or justification
for a crime. When jurors do discuss evidence presented in
mitigation, they often reject it because it does not measure up
to what they would consider an adequate excuse-a viable guilt
defense. In this light it is not surprising that lingering doubt
about the defendant's guilt, though not sufficient to forestall a
capital murder conviction, is the factor that makes jurors most
likely to reject a death sentence. 77 Thus their approach is again
guilt oriented, involving the elements of a crime-jurors are
thinking in legal categories, rather than making a reasoned
judgment about whether the defendant is deserving of the
ultimate penalty.
Like the Story Model and groupthink, a third factor
known as an "agentic shift" may also help account for our
175 Social

psychologists

recognize

the

possible

effects,

conscious

and

unconscious, of bias in making legal judgments: "If legal facts are reconstructed as
stories whose plausibility depends on understandings drawn from experience, then
jurors who come from different social worlds may disagree about the meaning and the
plausibility of the same stories." W. LANCE BENNETT & MARTHA S. FELDMAN,
RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE COURTROOM-JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT IN AMERICAN

CULTURE 171 (1981).
176 Even the procedural rules that mitigating factors
need not be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt to be considered, and that not all jurors must agree on the
presence of a mitigating circumstance in order for it to be taken into account, are
misunderstood by jurors. See infra, Addendum, Tbl. 3.
177 See Bowers et al., supra note 28, at 1535, Tbl.
12 (showing that lingering
doubt makes jurors less likely than mental retardation, mental illness, youth (less
than eighteen years of age), and extreme childhood abuse, to impose death).
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findings. In his controversial experiments on responsibility and
authority, Stanley Milgram found that ordinary citizens were
willing to inflict what they believed to be excruciating pain on
another human being, if reassured that they were not the ones
responsible for the suffering of those they believed they were
shocking with electric current. 178 The term "agentic shift" refers
to the tendency to transfer responsibility for one's actions from
oneself to some other agent, usually an authority figure or the
rules one is supposed to follow. Such an agentic shift, according
to Milgram, appears to be a normal human response among
careful and conscientious people confronted with an anxiety
provoking action in an unfamiliar situation with dire
consequences.
A juror making a life or death sentencing decision is in
the kind of situation that might well be expected to induce an
agentic shift.' Indeed, our three main findings are consistent
with such an agentic shift on the part of jurors who impose
death as punishment. Certainly, the fact that many jurors who
vote for the death penalty believe that death is the
presumptive punishment for aggravated murder or that the
law requires the death penalty when aggravated factors are
present is consistent with shifting responsibility from
themselves to the law as the responsible agent for the
defendant's punishment. Less obvious, focusing extensively on
the defendant's guilt and the aggravation of the crime in
making the death decision is likewise consistent with
transferring responsibility for the punishment, but in this
instance to the defendant, himself. There are shades here of
blaming the victim.18 And to the extent that the defendant and
the law are responsible for a death sentence, jurors may feel
278 See STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE To AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL

VIEW 132-34 (1974).
179 Robert Weisberg first drew attention to the parallel between Milgram's
subjects confronted with inflicting pain on others and capital jurors confronted with
imposing a death sentence. See Robert Weisberg, DeregulatingDeath, 1983 SUP. CT.
REv. 305, 391-92.
180 While the defendant's crime and the law that makes the death penalty
available for it are necessary conditions, the decision of the jury and, since it must be
unanimous, the decision of each individual juror are the sufficient conditions for a
death sentence. The jurors appear to accept the causal or determinative notion of
responsibility; they reject the moral notion of responsibility that makes them first and
foremost the ones responsible for the consequences of their actions, in this case their
vote to impose the death penalty.
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little need to take mitigation seriously, and thus avoid
assuming responsibility themselves for making a reasoned
moral choice.
Such an agentic shift is also consistent with jurors'
responses to a structured question in the Capital Jury Project
interview protocol that asked them who or what was most
responsible for the defendant's punishment. Jurors' responses
reveal that relatively few jurors see themselves as most
responsible for the defendant's punishment. ' Only one in ten
say the jury as a group and another one in ten say the juror as
an individual are most responsible for the punishment. The
agents most responsible for the death sentence, in their minds,
are the defendant who committed the crime and the law that
provides for death as punishment. More than half of the jurors
name the defendant himself as the one most responsible for his
punishment; another three out of ten jurors say the law is most
responsible for the punishment. In effect, jurors who have
imposed a death sentence are ready, if not eager, to place
responsibility for their decision elsewhere. 2
V.

WHAT CAN BE DONE?

The ultimate question is what, if anything, can be
done to ensure that jurors do what the law requires in the
penalty phase of capital cases. Both from reading these
transcripts and from other research and experience, it is our
belief that most jurors take their tasks seriously and make
every effort to fulfill their obligations with honesty and
diligence. The problem lies not with individual jurors, but with
a system that fails to cultivate or harness jurors' ability to
perform their functions in accordance with the law.
While the bifurcated trial provides some procedural
protections, jurors' accounts of the decision process have shown
that it simply does not ensure that capital jurors will make a
,81 See infra Addendum, Tbl. 4.
182

The tendency for jurors to avoid personal responsibility for the life or death

punishment decision is well documented by Joseph Hoffmann in his study of Indiana
capital jurors' accounts of how they personally viewed the sentencing decision. See
Joseph L. Hoffman, Where's the Buck?-Juror Misperception of Sentencing
Responsibility in Death Penalty Cases, 70 IND. L.J. 1137, 1142-55 (1995).
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"reasoned moral choice." More fundamental changes will be
required if jurors are to engage in truly independent decision
making about whether a defendant should live or die. A
different kind of sentencing hearing is needed, with a new jury
not committed to the prosecution's story from the outset, and
with the defense taking the stage first to present its story of
mitigation in terms of the defendant's character and
background. Such a new penalty phase would redefine the
decision-making process in the minds of jurors assembled
strictly for the purpose of making a reasoned moral judgment
about punishment and thus purge it of the pro-death leaning
produced by what Craig Haney has identified as the structural
aggravation of the guilt trial."n
Beyond such restructuring of the penalty trial,
changes are needed to make certain that jurors approach the
penalty phase with a truly open mind. Voir dire questioning
should work to remove jurors who believe death is the only
proper penalty for murder, rather than just removing those
who would always vote for life."' The questioning of
prospective jurors should be conducted so as to avoid giving the
impression that being able to consider the death penalty means
being willing to impose it in the present case. Several jurors
noted in their interviews that they were surprised to have been
accepted for service in light of their strong pro-death penalty
views. For example, one Texas juror recalled:
J:

I was hoping I'd never hear from them. 'Cause they badgered
me, the defense did, about the death penalty. And ... and I
told them, basically, that when a person took the opportunity
of robbing them and they were finished and everything was
fine, but then they decide to take them to . . . shoot them
because they can identify . . . this old lady and I found out
that's what happened. I couldn't believe I was chosen for
18

Craig Haney, Violence and the Capital Jury: Mechanisms of Moral

Disengagement and the Impulse to Condemn to Death, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1447, 1450-51
(1997).
1'4 The Supreme Court has held that the impartiality requirement of the Due
Process Clause entitles a capital defendant to challenge for cause any prospective juror
who will automatically vote for the death penalty in every case. Morgan, 504 U.S. at
729. The Court's opinion noted that South Carolina and Missouri appeared to follow
the Illinois practice, struck down in this case, of refusing to mandate inquiry regarding
so-called "reverse-Witherspoon" views as long as jurors swore that they would be fair
and impartial and follow the law. Id. at 725 n.4.
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it .... I would have given facetious answers but I was giving
what I felt about the system and there I was called to come.""

In addition to being more sensitive to jurors who find
death to be the only proper punishment for murder, judges and
lawyers should avoid requiring jurors to commit to being able
to impose a death sentence. It should be sufficient for jurors to
say that they can consider the death penalty as one of the
possible options. Forcing jurors, in the public setting of the
courtroom where they will perform their jury service, to affirm
that they can sentence the defendant to death has two
consequences. For some jurors, the statement during voir dire
seems to operate as a presumption of death-they see their
role, their duty from the start, as one involving a willingness
and ability to perform the specific task of imposing a death
sentence. Perhaps even more significantly, getting an
assurance from all jurors that they can vote for death provides
a powerful tool for pro-death members of a jury in persuading
more reluctant members. In several cases, jurors reported that
their fellow jurors holding out for a life sentence were
confronted with their statements on voir dire that they "could"
sentence was seen as
impose death; failure to agree to a 18death
6
tantamount to violating their oath.
Better sentencing instructions are needed. As Peter
Tiersma, Phoebe Ellsworth, Craig Haney, and others have
shown, jurors do not understand instructions about mitigation,
and simplifying the language of instructions can improve their
understanding. 187 Critical in this respect is the need to have
jurors understand the different rules that govern the
sentencing as opposed to the guilt decision. The self conscious
contrast the Supreme Court itself has drawn between the two
decisions in terms of the rules governing the level of proof and
the role of individual consideration should signal to jurors that
different rules apply to the decision about punishment. In the
penalty decision, jurors act not primarily as fact finders, but as
human beings responsible for making an individual judgment,
as a matter of conscience, about the defendant's life or death.
'8

TX-1616.
e.g., CA-10, 85; KY-646, 679, 700; SC-1232; TX-1583.
See, e.g., Tiersma, supra note 120, at 43-47; Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Are

18G See,
'87

Twelve Heads Better Than One?, 52 LAw & CONT. PROB. 205, 218-23 (1989).

20011

HOW JURORS DECIDE ON DEATH

1063

Yet the courts have generally rejected attempts to
reduce juror confusion about what the law requires, and what
it permits, in making the capital sentencing decision. In
8
the Supreme Court held that the
Buchanan v. Angelone,"'
Eighth Amendment does not require jury instructions on
mitigating evidence generally, or on any particular statutory
8 9 By this decision, the
mitigating factors included in a statute."
Court sanctioned Virginia instructions that, as dissenting
Justice Breyer put it, "tell the jury that evidence of mitigating
circumstances (concerning, say, the defendant's childhood and
his troubled relationship with the victims) is not relevant to
their sentencing decision." 9 ' And, despite convincing evidence
that jurors in Illinois failed to understand the pattern jury
instructions on how to weigh aggravating against mitigating
circumstances, and that a change in those instructions
improved comprehension, the courts have rejected claims that
death sentences imposed pursuant to jurors' mistaken
interpretation of the law violate the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. 9 '
Even if the reforms we have discussed above were in
place, the reality may be that deciding whether someone will
live or die is not something people can willingly do without
making an agentic shift in their thinking about responsibility
19

522 U.S. 269 (1998).

189 Id. at 276.

Id. at 282 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
191 See, e.g., Free v. Peters, 12 F.3d 700, 703-04 (7th Cir. 1993). The Illinois

Pattern Jury Instructions at issue in this case were virtually incomprehensible. In the
face of Illinois law requiring that a capital sentencing jury "weigh" the aggravating and
mitigating factors to determine whether to sentence the defendant to life or death, the
instructions told jurors: "[If from your consideration of the evidence and after due
deliberation you unanimously find that there are no mitigating factors sufficient to
preclude the imposition of the death sentence then you should return a verdict that the
defendant be sentenced to death." Id. at 704. A comprehensive study by Hans Zeisel,
accepted as statistically valid and accurate by the district court, had demonstrated
that this "sufficient to preclude" language failed to make clear the jurors' ability to
consider non-statutory mitigating circumstances and the burden of proof on such
mitigating factors. U.S. ex rel. Free v. Peters, 806 F. Supp. 705, 731-732 (N.D. Ill.
1992). The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reached out in the notorious case
involving serial killer John Wayne Gacy to hold that, regardless of the Zeisel study,
defendants are not entitled to relief in light of the legal "presumption" that juries
understand and follow the instructions given. Gacy v. Welborn, 994 F.2d 305, 313 (7th
Cir. 1993); see also Kimball R. Anderson & Bruce R. Braun, The Legal Legacy of John
Wayne Gacy: The IrrebuttablePresumption that Juries Understand and Follow Jury
Instructions, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 791, 797 (1995).
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for the defendant's punishment. Jurors' reluctance to be the
ones most responsible for the defendant's punishment might
still make them think foremost about the defendant's guilt as
the key to his punishment, believe that the law makes death
the correct punishment, and refuse to accept the story of the
defendant's life, character, and upbringing as matters that
they must consider in deciding between life and death as
punishment.
Ensuring that jurors approach the penalty phase of a
capital trial from a neutral position, with an openness to
imposition of a life sentence based on serious consideration of
mitigating circumstances, rather than tilted toward death from
the outset by the finding of guilt and aggravation, presents
what may be an insurmountable challenge. The awesome
responsibility of the capital sentencing decision and the
resulting tendency of jurors to think of responsibility for the
punishment in causal rather than moral terms may continue to
make them fail to meet the constitutional standards, despite
any changes that might be implemented. We simply may not
be able to design procedures that will make it possible for
jurors consistently to make a truly reasoned moral decision
that another human being should die.
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ADDENDUM

I.

JURORS' RESPONSES TO STRUCTURED QUESTIONS
CONCERNING THE CAPITAL SENTENCING DECISION IN

DEATH CASES
The purpose of this Addendum is threefold. First, it
will provide an independent statistical test of some of the
major inferences drawn from the preceding qualitative analysis
of jurors' narrative accounts describing how juries decide
whether to impose a death sentence. Second, it will afford a
systematic comparison of decision making under the principal
forms capital statutes take: threshold, weighing, and directed
statutes. A third aim is to establish the representativeness of
the cases selected for the preceding qualitative analysis with
respect to the full compliment of death cases in the CJP
database.
The substantive areas addressed in this Addendum
include (A) topics of discussion during the jury's punishment
deliberations, (B) jurors' beliefs about when the law requires
them to impose a death sentence, (C) jurors' beliefs about legal
restrictions on their consideration of mitigation, and (D) jurors'
beliefs about responsibility for the defendant's death sentence.
The tabulations presented below show the distribution of
responses in each of these areas separately for states with
threshold, weighing, and directed statutes (as represented by
Texas alone). To see how jurors in the cases chosen for the
foregoing analysis may differ from those in the larger sample
from which they were drawn, responses are shown for (1) all
662 jurors from the 204 death cases in the fourteen state CJP
sample,' 2 and (2) the 240 jurors from the 58 death cases in six
states examined in the foregoing qualitative analysis.

152
These data represent 57.3% of the 1,155 jurors who served on 60.0% of the
340 capital cases currently available in the full CJP database.
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Topics of DiscussionDuring Penalty Deliberations

If jurors are overwhelmed with considerations of the
defendant's guilt and the aggravation of the crime, and are
relatively unconcerned about aspects of mitigation when they
deliberate on the defendant's punishment, one might expect
this to be reflected in the topics they say the jury discussed
during its sentencing deliberations. In the section of the CJP
interview instrument devoted to the jury's deliberations on the
defendant's punishment, one question asked, "How much did
the discussion among the jurors focus on the following topics?"
It then listed some thirty-seven specific topics or issues that
might have been the subject of jury deliberations. For each
topic, jurors could indicate that discussion focused on it a
"great deal," a "fair amount," "not much," or "not at all."
The six most and six least discussed topics 193 appear in
Table 1, Panels A and B, respectively. The table shows the
percent reporting "a great deal" of discussion of each topic in
states with threshold statutes, with weighing statutes, and the
directed statute in Texas. Responses appear separately for
jurors in the full sample of death cases and in the cases
selected for the foregoing qualitative analysis.

113 The six most discussed and six least discussed topics
were determined on
the basis ofjurors' reports in the full sample of death cases. The six topics receiving the
most attention were discussed "a great deal" according to more than half of these
jurors, and the six receiving the least attention were discussed "a great deal" according
to less than a quarter of these jurors.
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Quite obviously, the most discussed topics have to do
with issues that typically arise in deciding on the level of the
defendant's guilt. The fact that "how weak or strong the
evidence of guilt was" ranks third among the thirty-seven
topics discussed, with two of three jurors affirming that it
received a great deal of discussion, demonstrates the guiltrelated character of punishment deliberations.' The only one
of these topics not explicitly related to the killing or the
question of guilt is "the defendant's dangerousness if ever back
in society," which is prominent as an aggravating factor in the
minds of many jurors. 95'
At the other extreme, nearly all of the least discussed
topics are arguably issues of mitigation. The defendant's
background or upbringing is broad enough to encompass much
of what the Supreme Court meant to include in its reference to
"an individualized examination of the defendant's character." 6
'" Although this statement of the topic does not distinguish between strength
and weakness of guilt evidence, since these are cases that end in a death sentence, it
seems likely that the chief focus of discussion is on the strength of the evidence. In any
case, this represents concern with guilt during deliberations on punishment.
155See William J. Bowers & Benjamin D. Steiner, Death by Default: An
EmpiricalDemonstrationof False and Forced Choices in CapitalSentencing, 77 TEX. L.
REV. 605, 668-69, Tbl. 7 (1999); see also Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Deadly
Confusion: JurorInstructionsin Capital Cases, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 7, Tbl. 2 (1993);
Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What Do Jurors
Think?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1538, 1559, Tbl. 4 (1998).
,06 For discussions of character as a mitigating factor, see Carol S. Steiker &
Jordan M. Steiker, Let God Sort Them Out? Refining the Individualization
Requirement in Capital Sentencing, 102 YALE L.J. 835, 846 (1992) (book review); see
also James R. Acker & Charles S. Lanier, In Fairnessand Mercy: Statutory Mitigating
Factorsin Capital PunishmentLaws, 30 CRIM. L. BULL. 299, 304-09 (1994). Professor
Garvey has further refined the issue of character as follows:
Penalty-phase culpability is not the same as guilt-phase culpability. A
defendant's culpability may be great enough to convict, yet not great
enough to sentence him to death. Evidence that reduces a defendant's
culpability for purposes of the penalty phase can be broken down into
two basic categories, which I'll call "proximate" and "remote."
Evidence of "proximate" reduced culpability is evidence that "suggests
an impairment of a defendant's capacity to control his or her criminal
behavior, or to appreciate its wrongfulness or likely consequences."
Evidence of "remote" reduced culpability, in contrast, focuses on the
defendant's character. It includes such things as abuse as a child and
other deprivations that may have helped shape the defendant into the
kind of person for whom a capital crime was a conceivable course of
action. In short, proximate reduced culpability speaks to the
defendant's lack of responsibility for what he has done; remote
reduced culpability speaks to his lack of responsibility for who he is.
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Most of the other topics in this section of the table pertain to
specific areas of mitigation that may not always be present, yet
the fact that fewer than one in five jurors report that any of
these factors receive a great deal of discussion is consistent
with the finding that they occupy a minor place in most
sentencing deliberations. Notably, "what moral values require,"
is very low on the list of discussed topics.
Between threshold and weighing states there is
virtually no difference in what jurors talk about during
punishment deliberations. The differences in the percent of
jurors saying topics were discussed a great deal between the
three threshold and the ten weighing states are less than five
points for ten of the twelve topics in Table 1. Moreover, the
exceptions are not substantial; the difference is 11.3 points in
discussion of the defendant's future dangerousness, and 7.5
points for alcohol as a factor in the crime.
Since the Texas directed statute makes the
defendant's likely future dangerousness a principal
consideration in reaching a penalty verdict,197 it is not
surprising to see that Texas jurors are much more likely than
their counterparts under other statutes to discuss this issue in
death cases. The percent of Texas jurors saying that this topic
receives a great deal of discussion is greater by 26.8 and 38.1
points than in the threshold and weighing states. On the other
hand, Texas jurors in death cases are somewhat less likely
than those under other statutes to report a great deal of
discussion about "the defendant's planning or premeditation,"
"the way in which the defendant was killed," "how weak or
strong the evidence of guilt was," and "what moral values
require." Perhaps their concern with future dangerousness
diverts them from thinking or talking about these other
matters.
The cases selected for the analysis reported in the
body of this Article are generally representative of the full
sample from which they were drawn in terms of topics
discussed during jury deliberations. Among the most discussed
topics, five of the eighteen possible comparisons between the
Garvey, supranote 195, at 1562 (footnotes omitted).
107 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROc. ANN. art. 37.071(b) (Vernon 1973), amended
by
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(2) (Vernon 1991).
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full and selected samples yield differences of ten percentage
points; only one reaches fifteen points. Not surprisingly, four of
these five differences, including the largest one, are differences
between Texas jurors in the full and selected samples; the
selected sample of only thirty-four Texas jurors from eight
cases is much smaller, and hence more subject to random
sampling error, than the selected samples of jurors from
threshold and weighing states. In all instances, more selected
than full sample Texas jurors say there was a great deal of
discussion of these guilt and aggravation related issues.
Among the least discussed topics, none of the
differences reach ten percentage points; only five comparisons
exceed five points. The selected thirty-four Texas jurors are
again the most volatile. Here they tend to report less
discussion of mitigation related topics than the full Texas
sample; in three instances the differences reach five points. In
one instance, discussion of the defendant's background or
upbringing, the relatively modest differences between full and
selected samples in threshold and weighing states, are in
opposite directions, thus producing a difference of 22.2 points
between these two kinds of statutes in the selected sample, as
compared to a five point difference in the full sample.'98 But
since the qualitative analysis makes no inferences about the
relative frequency of such discussions between threshold and
weighing states, this sampling discrepancy creates no problems
for the analysis.
B.

Jurors'Beliefs About a MandatoryDeath Sentence

Since many jurors explained that "the law requires
death for this kind of killing" in their narrative descriptions of
how the jury reached its sentencing decision, one should expect
to find that many of them personally believe that death is
required when a common aggravating factor is proved by the
evidence. One question in the CJP interview asked jurors
'S An examination of the six states from which the selected cases were drawn

reveals that none of the discrepancy in threshold states is due to the choice of states
(20.5 in the full sample vs. 20.6 in the selected states), but that roughly half of the
difference in weighing states is due to the choice of the three of ten weighing states
(25.5 in the full sample vs. 30.9 in the selected states).
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whether they believed the law required the death penalty if
certain facts about the crime were proved. Specifically, the
question asked, "After hearing the judge's instructions, did you
believe that the law required you to impose a death sentence if
the evidence proved that (a) the defendant's conduct was
heinous, vile or depraved, and (b) the defendant would be
dangerous in the future?" Jurors' responses appear in Table 2,
again broken down by types of statute for both the full and
selected samples of death cases.
Mistakenly, half of the capital jurors in death cases
believed that the law required them to impose a death sentence
if the evidence proved the defendant's conduct was heinous,
vile or depraved, and four out of ten believed that the death
penalty was required by law if the evidence proved the
defendant would be dangerous in the future. The fundamental
misunderstandings about what the law requires of jurors if the
evidence proved that the defendant's conduct was heinous, vile,
or depraved are about equally present under threshold,
weighing and directed statutes. The misunderstanding that the
law required death if the evidence proved that the defendant
would be dangerous in the future is, however, decidedly more
common under Texas' directed statute than under threshold or
weighing statutes: differences of 24.8 and 28.9 percentage
points, respectively. No doubt, the special consideration
accorded dangerousness under Texas' directed statute explains
why Texas jurors are well ahead of others in believing that the
death penalty is required by law if the evidence proves that the
defendant would be dangerous in the future.
Note that these two factors were among the six topics
most likely to be discussed a great deal during punishment
deliberations. 9 9 Apparently, extensive discussion of these
topics is not a corrective to misunderstandings. Instead, it
appears to be the mechanism through which these pro-death
misunderstandings of the law become a legal reality for capital
defendants.
199
See supra Tbl. 1, Panel A, items 2 and 6. Discussion of "the way in which
the victim was killed" (Tbl. 1, item 2) would seem to encompass evidence that "the
defendant's conduct was heinous, vile, or depraved." The correspondence between the
discussion of "the defendant's dangerousness if ever back in society" (Tbl. 1, item 6)
and evidence that "the defendant would be dangerous in the future" is obvious.

2001]

1073

HOW JURORS DECIDE ON DEATH
(D
--)

a,
(L)

c, VD
toL

to Nd

00
C.)C)

bla,

to a,

C

0

a,

sa

a,

-.14~

E--'aw

C~d>

-4

~

a~~

a

b-0-

0

ao

p4

a,0
cC.

-P $

E-:

'boo

:
Q

k
0
4-

k

a

amroIS

0

a)
r.0

C)

k

E--4a

t-,

-4.3 :

a,

c
c

1074

BROOKLYN LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 66: 4

In threshold and weighing states, jurors' responses to
these two questions in the full and selected samples are quite

close; differences do not exceed five points. In the relatively
small number of Texas cases selected for the qualitative

analysis jurors are even more likely than in the full Texas
sample to believe the law requires death when either of these
factors is proved. In both instances the differences between full
and selected samples exceed ten percentage points. Since Texas

is the only state in our full sample with a directed statute,
these discrepencies are not attributable to a state selection
bias.
Jurors'Beliefs About Restrictions on Mitigation

C.

There is evidence that jurors misunderstand the
constitutionally prescribed standards and rules for considering
mitigating evidence in a way that promotes the imposition of
the death penalty."' Indeed, most jurors appear to think that
the punishment decision is governed by the same standards
and procedures that apply to the guilt decision; they fail to
appreciate that the sentencing decision is subject to less
stringent standards of proof and decision rules deemed
appropriate by the Supreme Court for a reasoned moral choice
as opposed to a fact finding inquiry.
Two questions in the CJP interviews dealt specifically
with rules governing the consideration of mitigation. One
asked, "For a factor in favor of a life or lesser sentence to be
considered, did it have to be proved (a) beyond a reasonable
doubt, (b) by a preponderance of the evidence, or (c) only to a
juror's personal satisfaction?" The other question asked, "For a
factor in favor of a life or lesser sentence to be considered, did
(a) all jurors have to agree on that factor, or (b) did jurors not
have to agree unanimously on that factor." The correct answers
for guilt decision making and manifestly incorrect answers for
decision making on punishment are that such factors have to
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt and that all jurors had to
agree on that factor. Table 3 shows the extent to which jurors
200

See James Luginbuhl & Julie Howe, Discretion in Capital Sentencing

Instructions:Guided or Misguided?, 70 IND. L.J. 1163, 1165-66, Tbl. 1 (1995).
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are mistaken about these rules for the consideration of
mitigation. Again the table shows responses of jurors under
threshold, weighing, and directed statutes for both the full and
selected samples.
Overall, half of the jurors in death cases mistakenly
believed that a mitigating factor had to be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt and that all jurors had to agree on that factor
for it to be considered in mitigation. Hence, just as jurors
erroneously believe that proof of commonly argued aggravating
factors requires them to impose the death penalty (Table 2), so
too, jurors wrongly believe that the stringent fact finding rules
for decision making about guilt and aggravation apply as well
to the reasoned moral decision making about punishment
(Table 3).
In this case, the extent of jurors' misunderstandings
varies with the form of the statute. Under the directed statute,
Texas jurors are more likely than others to believe that
mitigating factors must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
With no mention of mitigation in the Texas statute for the
period when most Texas cases in our sample were tried, Texas
jurors appear to have been least aware of a different standard
of proof for mitigation than for guilt or aggravation. Under
threshold statutes, Georgia, Kentucky, and South Carolina
jurors are more likely than others to wrongly believe that
unanimity is required for the consideration of a mitigating
factor. With no explicit requirement to weigh mitigating
against aggravating factors, they appear to ignore the decision
rules for considering mitigation. Under weighing statutes,
jurors are less mistaken on each of these issues. But more
critical is the fact that close to five out of ten jurors, even in the
weighing states, which comprise more than two thirds of the
full sample, are mistaken on each of these rules for the
consideration of mitigating factors.
The responses of jurors selected for this intensive
qualitative analysis closely correspond with those in the full
sample of death cases, except in Texas where these questions
were omitted from a large portion of the interviews. Questions
in the "Sentencing Guidelines" section of the interview
instrument, where these two question appear, were found to be
difficult to answer or not applicable by many Texas jurors.
Consequently, at a certain point in the data collection this

20011

HOW JURORS DECIDE ON DEATH

1077

entire section was deleted from the interviews conducted in
that state. In none of the Texas cases that met the sampling
criteria were jurors asked these questions.
D.

Responsibilityfor the Defendant'sPunishment

Of course, jurors acting as a group are the ones who
decide what the defendant's punishment should be, and the
Supreme Court has ruled that arguments that would diminish
jurors' sense of responsibility for the punishment decision are
unconstitutional.2 1 The beliefs of a good many jurors that the
death penalty is required by law under specified conditions (as
shown in Table 2) might be expected to make jurors believe
that it is not they themselves as jurors but the law that is
responsible for the defendant's punishment. Beyond this, the
preoccupation of many jurors with the defendant's guilt in
deciding on punishment might lead them to think that because
he has been proven responsible for the crime he is also the one
responsible for his punishment.
To learn how jurors assigned responsibility for the
defendant's punishment, the CJP interview included a
question that asked jurors to rank the following from "most"
through "least" responsible for the defendant's punishment.
The questions then listed the following options: (a) the law that
states what punishment applies, (b) the judge who imposes the
sentence, (c) the jury that votes for the sentence, (d) the
individual juror since the jury's decision depends on the vote of
each juror, and (e) the defendant because his/her conduct is
what actually determined the punishment. The percentage of
jurors assigning foremost responsibility to each of these options
appears in Table 4, again broken down by type of statute and
shown for both the full and selected samples of death cases.
Above all, jurors see the defendant himself as the one
most responsible for his punishment; more than half of the
jurors under each type of statute pick this option. Next in line
is the law that provides for death as punishment; here under
each type of statute at least three out of ten jurors say the law
201 The Supreme Court has held that it is an "intolerable danger" for jurors to

believe that "the responsibility for any ultimate determination of death will rest with
others." Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 333 (1985).
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is most responsible for the defendant's punishment. Few jurors
see themselves as most responsible; roughly one in ten say the
jury as a group and another one in ten say the juror as an
individual are most responsible for the punishment. In no case
do the percentage of jurors saying that primary responsibility
lies with jurors as a group and individually combined reach the
percent saying that the law is primarily responsible; and in no
case does the percent saying that the law is most responsible
exceed the percent who assign primary responsibility to the
defendant himself. Quite evidently, jurors are not inclined to
claim foremost responsibility for the life or death decision. Nine
out of ten deny individual personal responsibility, and as many
deny responsibility in their role as members of the jury charged
with making the punishment decision.
This pattern is relatively unaltered by type of statute
or between the full and selected samples of death cases.
Threshold jurors are slightly more likely than others to see
themselves individually as primarily responsible, and the
directed Texas jurors are slightly more likely than others to see
the judge as primarily responsible; yet these are differences on
the order of only five percentage points in the fall sample. The
jurors in the selected cases track those in the full sample quite
closely; in only one of fifteen comparisons do the selected and
full samples differ by as much as five percentage points.
The way jurors assign responsibility for the
defendant's punishment echoes the principal findings of this
research. The data show that jurors are preoccupied with guilt
in making their punishment decisions. Of course, in rendering
a guilty verdict they find that the defendant is the one
responsible for the crime. They appear to extend responsibility
for the crime to responsibility for the punishment, perhaps
because they genuinely believe that the defendant's
punishment is ordained by his crime, that their job is simply to
affirm the inherent or preordained punishment which the
convicted defendant has brought upon himself. Beyond this,
the data show jurors believe the law requires death as
punishment for such crimes. For instance, many say that death
is required if the evidence proves the atrocious character of the
crime or the future dangerousness of the defendant. In this
view, the law is the authority, the responsible agent that
ordains or dictates death as punishment for those who commit
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such crimes. By contrast, the data show that jurors discount
and ignore mitigation in making their death decisions. The
relatively minor role jurors
report that mitigating
considerations play in such jury deliberation is consistent with
the finding that few jurors see themselves as primarily
responsible for the death decision. The fact that they see
themselves as less responsible than the defendant or the law
points to their failure to engage as responsible agents, ready to
make a "reasoned moral choice."

